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instruments offered their readers mere technical documentation; 
patent cases presented no more than the mapping of a text onto 
an instantiated artifact; patent policy was principally oriented 
toward economic optimization of the length and scope of 
protection. l 
Unbound from technology, contemporary patent law now 
seems a more robust discipline. Modern patent instruments 
appropriate a diverse array of techniques that span the entire 
range of human endeavor.2 Patent claims, cut loose from physical 
moorings, have grown more abstract and oriented toward human 
behavior.3 We have yet to realize fully the consequences of post-
industrial patenting, but the potential impact of the patent law 
upon personal liberties is becoming more apparent and more 
worthy of concern. Although the principles of the patent canon 
demonstrate sufficient flexibility to regulate uses of such 
inventions as software,4 business methods,5 and genetic 
fragments,6 they persist in bearing little regard for civil rights. 
The private rule making, made possible through the patent law, 
holds the potential to impinge upon individual liberties in ways 
not previously considered possible. 
This Article begins in Part I with an overview of 
contemporary patent acquisition and enforcement. Transformed 
to meet the commercial demands of post-industrial enterprise, 
the patent system now is marked by limitless subject matter, 
lenient public grant, and the possibility of vigorous private 
enforcement. Patents were once the province of commercial 
enterprises seeking to preserve market share. As suggested by 
the notorious human chimera application of Jeremy Rifkin and 
1. See John S. Leibovitz, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent System, 111 YALE L.J. 
2251, 2254 (2002) (noting that the length and breadth of patents are "familiar 
dimensions ... policy makers can manipulate" to improve economic efficiency). 
2. Refer to notes 22-33 infra and accompanying text (discussing the vast array of 
subject matter in contemporary patent law); see John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the 
Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1139-42 (1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Liberal 
Professions] (chronicling patent regime expansion from the technological innovations of 
the Industrial Revolution to the broad categories of subject matter patentable today). 
3. Refer to notes 22-33 infra and accompanying text (noting the recent increase in 
patents issued in areas including art, athletics, architecture, and economics). 
4. See generally Wesley L. Austin, Software Patents, 7 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 225, 
226-53 (1999) (discussing the case law leading up to and establishing software 
patentability in the United States). 
5. See generally Kevin M. Baird, Business Method Patents: Chaos at the USPTO or 
Business as Usual?, 2001 J.L. TECH. & POLY 347,347-52 (2001) (tracing the history of 
business method patentability from initial judicial rejection to modern day acceptance). 
6. See generally Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration Solution for Expressed Sequence 
Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735 (discussing the "intense controversy" surrounding the 
patentability of gene fragments and the response of the U.S. Patent Office). 
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Stewart Newman,7 patenting now offers an accessible mechanism 
for the suppression of objectionable behavior. 
Part II of this Article explores further the use of patents as 
instruments of public advocacy. It discovers in the public rolls 
granted patents that regulate access to abortion procedures, limit 
the ability to comply with federal law, and suppress speech. 
In Part III, this Article concludes that constitutional 
protections such as substantive due process, equal protection, 
and freedom of speech are unlikely to be of direct application 
during patent litigation. The reason is that patentees are not 
ordinarily state actors, and thus are unrestricted by the Bill of 
Rights. This determination holds startling consequences. If 
Congress unduly restricted a fundamental liberty interest, a 
facial challenge would prove fatal to the statute. Yet if the U.S. 
Patent Office (Patent Office)8 issued identically worded patent 
claims to a private actor, the patent could be freely enforced 
without regard to constitutional limitations. 
Part IV of this Article recognizes that post-industrial 
patenting implicates constitutional values in ways that the 
venerable patent canon does not acknowledge. Reasoning that 
the courts will remain the principal custodians of a patent 
system in transition, this Article suggests that the faint but 
persistent non delegation doctrine may hold lessons for the 
modem patent community. 9 Viewing patents as delegated 
rulemaking offers a resonant point of departure for assessing the 
scope of patent rights and the procedural merits of longstanding 
patent practice. This Article closes by encouraging further 
consideration of the nondelegation doctrine as a mechanism for 
curbing the excesses of the contemporary patent system. 
I. PATENTING As PRIVATIZATION 
The regime of patents stands among the federal 
government's early efforts at privatization. In lieu of establishing 
a system of national . laboratories or scheme of prizes, the 
Framers instead opted to harness the energies of private 
enterprise to advance the "useful ArtS."lO In the style of a Letter 
7. Refer to notes 37-51 infra and accompanying text (discussing the human 
chimera patent application, which claims a method for combining human and embryo 
cells to produce a single embryo). 
8. The ''U.S. Patent Office" is more properly termed the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
9. Refer to notes 294-369 infra and accompanying text (examining the possible 
role of the constitutional principle of nondelegation in limiting expansive modern patent 
law). 
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 572 2002-2003
572 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [39:569 
of Marque, 11 the patent law allows inventors to reap the economic 
rewards of their innovative activity.12 The patent law does so by 
granting inventors exclusive rights in their claimed inventions. 13 
Others bear the duty to avoid the patented invention,14 an 
obligation enforced by injunctionl5 and monetary damages.16 
The patent system traditionally encouraged innovative 
activity only within a discrete aspect of human endeavor. As 
conceived by the English Statute of Monopolies of 162317 and 
applied for nearly four centuries, the patent system concerned 
applied technology. IS Pragmatic innovation within the core 
disciplines of biology, chemistry, physics, and allied engineering 
disciplines was patentable. 19 Matters of aesthetics, business 
acumen, social observation, or personal skill remained without 
the patent system no matter how novel or innovative.20 Creative 
endeavors within such fields fell within intellectual property 
regimes with a less robust set of proprietary rights, or simply 
were not amenable to privatization at all.21 
The regulatory scope of the patent system has expanded 
dramatically in recent years. Emblematic of this trend is the 
11. See u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (empowering Congress to "grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 627 (6th ed. 1991) (defining letter of 
marque and reprisal as "laIn authorization formerly granted in time of war by a 
government to the owner of a private vessel to capture enemy vessels and goods on the 
high seas"). 
12. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 153-154, 261 (governing patent issuance, provisional, and 
ownership rights). 
13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (empowering Congress to secure "for limited 
times to Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries"); see also 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) ("Every patent shall ... grant to the patentee ... the right to exclude 
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the 
United States or importing the invention into the United States .... "). 
14. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (imposing patent infringement liability for specified acts of 
nonavoidance). 
15. Id. § 283. 
16. Id. § 284. 
17. See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1143 n.22 (citing to "the 
forebearer of contemporary patent legislation, the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623," 
21 Jam. I, ch. 3 (1624)). 
18. See id. at 1143 (suggesting that patent law was originally intended to 
encompass only "manufactures," human-made artifacts). 
19. See Orin S. Kerr, Are We Overprotecting Code? Thoughts on First-Generation 
Internet Law, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1287, 1295 (2000) (recognizing as a fundamental 
axiom of traditional patent law that "any patentable invention had to rest on some 
interaction with realspace, with the natural world of physics, chemistry, and biology"). 
20. See Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1181 (noting that matters 
including social observation, human behavior, business methods, and aesthetics would be 
exempt from the patent system today under the original industrial application standard). 
21. Id. (observing that subject matters which "do not involve the creation or 
transformation of material objects and are not repeatable in an industrial sense" fail to 
satisfy the requisites of patentability). 
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1998 decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. u. Signature Financial Group, 
Inc. 22 In State Street, the Federal Circuit held that a 
computerized system for managing a stock fund constituted 
patentable subject matter.23 Rejecting the venerable bar on the 
patenting of business methods, the court proclaimed anything 
that achieved "a useful, concrete and tangible result" was eligible 
for patenting.24 Soon after, another Federal Circuit opinion said it 
best: "virtually anything is patentable."25 
The State Street decision held dramatic consequences for the 
patent system. Industries long strangers to patenting, such as 
insurance, financial services, and advertising, have begun filing 
applications at the Patent Office.26 E-commerce patent litigation 
has already entered the judicial arena, with hardly a week 
passing without word of another lawsuit filed pertaining to a 
patented advertising, auction, or sales technique.27 Patents 
appropriating such unlikely techniques as artistic methods,28 
athletic moves,29 architecturalstyles,30 and macroeconomic 
theories31 would once have been relegated to a popular 
compilation of unusual patents,32 but now they have become too 
commonplace to ignore. The patent system has once again 
entered the public consciousness, inspiring numerous editorials 
and commentaries.33 
22. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
23. Id. at 1370. 
24. Id. at 1373, 1375-77. 
25. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1384, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(Clevenger, J., dissenting from an order denying rehearing en bane). 
26. See Jeffrey A. Berkowitz, Business-Method Patents: How to Protect Your Clients' 
Interests, 688 PLIIPAT. 7, 9-11 (2002) (emphasizing the "new era" importance of patents 
in the business community and other traditionally nontechnical areas). 
27. See Karen Rodriguez, Dot-coms Scramble for Patent Protection in Record 
Numbers, Bus. J., Sept. 8, 2000, at 9 (reporting a "swelling rash" of patent infringement 
lawsuits following a dramatic increase in Internet patent grants), available at 2000 WL 
26139882. 
28. U.S. Patent No. 6,022,219 (issued Feb. 8, 2000) ("Painting Kit and Related 
Method"). 
29. U.S. Patent No. 5,616,089 (issued Apr. 1, 1997) ("Method ofPutting"). 
30. U.S. Patent No. 5,806,260 (issued Sept. 15, 1998) ("Restaurant and Hotel 
Combination"). 
31. U.S. Patent No. 6,112,188 (issued Aug. 29, 2000) ("Privatization Marketplace"). 
32. E.g., RICK FEINBERG, PECULIAR PATENTS: A COLLECTION OF UNUSUAL AND 
INTERESTING INVENTIONS FROM THE FILES OF THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE (1994). 
33. See Editorial, Patent Wrongs, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2001, at B6 (critiquing the 
"abuse" of drug patents by firms in the pharmaceutical industry), available at 2001 WL 
2546763; Lawrence M. Sung & Jeff E. Schwartz, Business Method Defense, 22 NAT'L L.J. 
33, Apr. 10, 2000, at B8 ("Public scrutiny of patent protection in the United States has 
arguably risen to unprecedented levels."). 
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Once the patent system was restricted to technology.34 The 
contemporary consensus is that patenting embraces the entire 
commercial world.35 Now a persistent trend suggests that the 
patent system holds further possibilities for other sorts of 
innovators.36 Having fully embraced post-industrial innovation, 
our patent system is now ripe for postmodern uses. Formerly the 
province of technology-driven enterprises seeking to appropriate 
the physical artifacts they brought to market, the patent system 
now offers a robust mechanism for preemption of the behaviors, 
techniques, and activities that political actors wish to segregate 
from the marketplace of ideas. Stated succinctly, the U.S. patent 
system has already begun to serve as an instrument for public 
advocacy. 
Consider the human chimera application recently filed by 
noted anti-biotechnology crusader Jeremy Rifkin.37 Through 
organized protest and passionate writing, Rifkin has advanced 
his strident objections to biotechnology for over two decades. 38 
Among his concerns is the patenting of living inventions.39 Rifkin 
holds that biotechnology patents demean life, disrupt the 
traditions of the agricultural community, encourage genetic 
prospecting of the pharmacopeia of traditional peoples, and 
accelerate the advance of a technology which holds fearful 
consequences for humanity.40 Rifkin's protests reached the U.S. 
Supreme Court through the mechanism of an amicus curiae brief 
in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.41 Although ultimately holding that 
bioengineered microorganisms were patentable, the Court 
acknowledged Rifkin's concerns as a "parade of horribles" that 
Congress should address.42 
34. Refer to notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text (commenting on the 
historical confinement of the patent regime to artifacts of the Industrial Revolution). 
35. Refer to notes 22-33 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Federal 
Circuit's decision in State Street and its aftermath). 
36. Id.; see also Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1140-41 ("[Tlhe scope 
of the statutory term 'process' appears co-extensive with nearly any possible endeavor 
[thatl can be articulated in a series of steps in the fashion of patent instrument."). 
37. The patent application, covering the production of chimeras up to 50% human, 
was filed on December 18, 1997. Thomas A. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal 
Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 443, 443 (1999). 
38. See Paul S. Naik, Biotechnology Through the Eyes of an Opponent: The 
Resistance of Activist Jeremy Rifkin, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 'J['J[ 5, 15-17 (2000). 
39. Id. 'J['J[ 86-91 (discussing Rifkin's beliefs that the patenting of life forms would 
lead to adverse and far-reaching genetic and social impacts). 
40. Id. 'J['J[ 18-31. 
41. 447 U.S. 303 (1980); see also Naik, supra note 38, at 'J['J[ 85-91 (summarizing 
Rifkin's three main arguments in his amicus brief opposing the grant of a patent for a 
genetically altered bacterium). 
42. Diamond, 447 U.S. at 316-18. 
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Rifkin's long-held views suggest that he would be loathe to 
file a patent application claiming an invention of biotechnology. 
Not so. Along with cellular biologist Dr. Stuart Newman, Rifkin 
has recently filed a patent application claiming a method for 
combining human and animal embryo cells to produce a single 
embryo.43 This embryo could then be implanted in a human or 
animal surrogate mother, resulting in the birth of a "chimera," or 
mixture of the two species.44 The Newman-Rifkin application 
specifically mentions chimeras made in part "from mice, 
chimpanzees, baboons, and pigs.,,45 Researchers have 
experimented with these hybrid beings as subjects for drug 
testing and as a source of replacement organs for ailing 
humans.46 
Newman and Rifkin are unusual inventors in that they hope 
that their patent application is ultimately rejected.47 Their aim is 
to provoke debate on the patentability ofliving inventions.48 They 
do not seek to practice their invention, and hope that others will 
not either. 49 Yet Newman and Rifkin must realize that if the 
Patent Office does allow their patent to issue, they still will have 
gained a victory of sorts. As patentees, Newman and Rifkin 
would be appointed the private regulators of chimera 
technology. 50 Most notably, any issued patent would enable them 
to enforce a twenty-year moratorium on the use of chimera 
technology within the United States.51 
The human chimera application presents a compelling 
example of using patents to block the objectionable behavior of 
others. It is not an isolated one. The roll of granted patents 
already suggests the very real prospects of a pro-life group filing 
43. See Magnani, supra note 37, at 446 (describing the three techniques covered 
under the Rifkin-Newman patent application for combining human and animal cells). 
44. Id. at 445-46 (comparing one technique covered by the patent to a procedure 
used in the 1980s to create an animal called a "geep" that was part goat and part sheep). 
45. Id. at 446-47. 
46. See Paul Recer, Debate on Cell Research May Lead to Judicial Definition of 
"Human," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, June 19, 1999, at 4A. 
47. See Magnani, supra note 37, at 443 (noting that Newman and Rifkin hope for 
rejection to result in Patent Office procedural alterations to prohibit future patenting of 
similar genetic manipulation techniques). 
48. Id. at 443, 459. 
49. See id. at 443 (explaining that by obtaining the patent, Newman and Rifkin 
hope to prevent other scientists from creating human-animal chimeras long enough to 
convince the American public to support an outright ban on such techniques). 
50. See Recer, supra note 46, at 4A (recounting that, according to Rifkin, the 
human-chimera patent would cover all research activities in which scientists insert 
human genes into laboratory animals). 
51. Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000) (providing that a patent term begins on 
the issue date and ends twenty years from the application filing date). 
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a patent application claiming an abortion-inducing substance, a 
human rights organization appropriating a racial profiling 
technique, or one political party claiming that another's soft 
money campaign financing infringes its intellectual property 
rights. Whether or not Newman and Rifkin are judged to be the 
inventors of human chimera technology, they may one day be 
identified as the champions of a provocative and distorting use of 
the patent system. The early stewards of our patent system never 
envisioned the prospect of public advocates anticipating 
objectionable activities, prosecuting patent applications, and 
being granted a proprietary interest in prohibitive regulation. 52 
Historical suspicions aside, the consequences of a postmodern 
patent system are disturbing for other reasons. 
One concern arises from the fact that the patent right is an 
exceptionally robust one. Although the twenty-year patent term 
is short in comparison to other intellectual property rights,53 few 
restraining doctrines allay a patent's scope of exclusivity. 
Liability rests solely upon a comparison of the text of the patent 
instrument with an accused infringement, whether or not the 
defendant derived the invention from the patentee. 54 The patent 
law also lacks an effective defense in the nature of copyright 
law's fair use privilege. 55 Nor does patent law charge the patentee 
with practicing the patented invention in order to fulfill public 
demand.56 Patent proprietors have successfully employed their 
intellectual property to suppress technology in the past.57 There 
is little reason to suspect that patents may not be used 
successfully as moratoria in the future. 
52. Cf Thomas, Liberal Professions, supra note 2, at 1164 (suggesting that the 
Framers viewed patentable subject matter as including only the industrial, mechanical, 
and manual arts of the late eighteenth century). 
53. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (providing that a patent term is ordinarily 
twenty years from the date of filing of the patent application), with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) 
(2000) (stating that a basic copyright term endures the life of the author plus seventy 
years). 
54. See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAw 860-61 
(1998). 
55. Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1181-211 (2000) (arguing for a patent law fair use defense in order 
to fill increasingly apparent gaps in existing law). 
56. See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a 
Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 389, 402 (2002) [hereinafter 
Saunders, Patent Nonuse] ("As a general rule, a patentee is not obligated, under either 
patent or antitrust laws, to use or allow others to use a patent."). 
57. See generally Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics 
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884-916 (1990) (finding that patentees' use of 
broad claims in various industries often had the effect of considerably slowing the pace of 
technological improvements). 
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Current trends in the administration of the patent regime 
should sound further alarms. Persistent commentary contends 
that the work product of the Patent Office suffers from 
diminished quality. 58 Many newly issued patents appear to 
appropriate familiar concepts that lie within the public domain. 
One claims an auction method that allegedly has been used at 
the U.S. Treasury Department for decades.59 Another patented 
invention, allowing a restaurant to sell aged food at reduced 
prices, bears a strong resemblance to a baker's sale of day-old 
bread.60 Still another, heralded by the Wall Street Journal as a 
"billion-dollar patent," claims a computerized process for carrying 
out an international transaction that some analysts say has been 
used in the field for many years.61 
Perhaps the most notorious business method patent, 
Amazon.com's "one-click" patent,62 also appears to privatize an 
everyday commercial activity. The Amazon.com patent claims a 
method of ordering merchandise on the Internet with a single 
action, such as one click of a mouse button.63 Yet anyone who has 
used a vending machine seems to have engaged in single-action 
ordering. Amazon.com nevertheless convinced the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Washington to issue a 
preliminary injunction shutting down a competing streamlined 
purchasing method.64 Believing that the accused infringer would 
likely prevail in its patent invalidity argument, the Federal 
Circuit ultimately overturned the preliminary injunction.65 The 
58. E.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: 
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 577, 588-91 (1999) [hereinafter Merges, Six Impossible Patentsl. 
59. U.S. Patent No. 5,897,620 (issued Apr. 27, 1999) ("Method and Apparatus for 
the Sale of Airline-Specified Flight Tickets"); see also Byron L. Winn, Readers Say: 
Patently Absurd?, FORBES, May 31, 1999, at 18 (claiming the Priceline.com patent is akin 
to a business method used by the U.S. Treasury Department, known as the "Dutch 
Auction"). 
60. U.S. Patent No. 6,052,667 (issued Apr. 18, 2000) ("Method and Apparatus for 
Selling an Aging Food Product as a Substitute for an Ordered Product"); see also Julia 
Angwin, "Business-Method" Patents, Key to Priceline, Draw Growing Protest, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 3, 2000, at B1. 
61. William F. Bulkeley, E-Business: A Billion-Dollar Patent?-Software Developer 
Is Seeking to Protect Process Using Internet for Foreign Trade, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2000, 
at B1 (noting that anyone conducting computer-to-computer international trades over the 
Internet is a potential patent infringer). 
62. U.S. Patent No. 5,960,411 (issued Sept. 28, 1999) ("Method and System for 
Placing a Purchase Order via a Communications Network"). 
63. Id. 
64. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1249 (W.D. 
Wash. 1999). 
65. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 
2001). 
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parties have since settled their dispute,66 leaving an 
improvidently granted patent to linger on the public rolls. 
Having enjoyed two holiday seasons with the injunction in place, 
Amazon.com ought not be terribly disappointed with the Federal 
Circuit's decision. 
Numerous factors explain our increasingly porous Patent 
Office. Thanks in part to broader judicial pronouncements of 
patentable subject matter, the number of filed patent 
applications has risen dramatically.67 Actors within the financial, 
insurance, and healthcare management industries, once without 
the patent system, now aggressively seek patent protection.68 The 
advent of the TRIPS Agreement,69 a component of the World 
Trade Organization Agreement, has also significantly 
strengthened foreign patent regimes. 70 Innovative enterprises are 
more eager to obtain patent rights overseas than ever before, and 
they typically commence this process by filing a domestic 
application. 71 The Patent Office also finds itself strapped for cash 
and short of qualified examiners.72 Miserly congressional policies 
have stripped funding from the Patent Office, and the high 
demand for skilled, knowledgeable workers makes hiring 
qualified technical personnel more difficult. 73 ' 
The stewards of our patent system have not only proclaimed 
all things patentable, but they have ensured that patents are 
66. Amazon Settles Suit Against Online Rival Over Buying Shortcut, WALL ST. J., 
Mar. 8, 2002, at B5. 
67. Bruce Kisliuk & Jessie Marshall, Business Is Booming, 1 PTO TODAY 1, 17-19 
(Jan. 2000), at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/ptotoday/Ol.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 11, 2002). 
68. Berkowitz, supra note 26, at 9-11. 
69. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS 
Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 
31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_eltrips_eI 
LagmO_e.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2002). 
70. See J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum Standards of Intellectual Property 
Protection Under the TRIPS Component of the WTO Agreement, 29 INT'L LAw. 345, 345-
60 (1995) (analyzing the effects of the TRIPS Agreement on patent protection in both 
developed and developing countries). 
71. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 361-368 (2000) (governing international applications filed in 
the United States). 
72. See Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 58, at 606-07 (commenting on 
the high examiner turnover rate, caused in part by the low salaries earned by senior 
examiners and inadequate training for inexperienced examiners). 
73. See generally John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: 
Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 727, 
728-30, 741-44 (2002) !hereinafter Thomas, Rulemakerl (arguing that budgetary 
constraints, increasing filing rates, and the broadening range of patentable subject matter 
contribute to the need for patent administration reform). 
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easier to obtain than ever before.74 A confluence of lax public 
grant and the possibility for vigorous private enforcement has 
transformed the patent system into the ultimate regulatory 
regime. The appropriation of any technique, protocol, or behavior 
engagement, not to preserve market share but to suppress its 
practice, seems a very real possibility.75 
Patent law is not· always the best tool for the political 
advocate. Patents must disclose an invention not already 
available within the public domain,76 which requires advocates to 
anticipate behaviors they find objectionable. The Patent Ace7 
also requires that issued patent instruments fully disclose the 
invention they appropriate,78 a complication for patentees who 
wish to suppress their inventions. As well, patent rights 
ordinarily extend only twenty years from the date the application 
was filed. 79 Patents also tend to be difficult to enforce against the 
state. For example, the federal government may not be enjoined 
from practicing the patented invention,80 and recent Supreme 
Court decisions have rendered enforcement against state 
governments uncertain.81 Still, where the technique will likely be 
practiced only for a discrete period of time, the actors of concern 
are private entities, and the number of potential infringers is 
limited, the patenting of that technique presents a neglected 
possibility for public advocacy. 
Patenting has prompted concerned commentary throughout 
its history. When patents were confined to technology, observers 
tied the patent system to such issues as pricing, public health, 
and industry concentration.82 Now that our patent system has 
74. See id. (citing reports that the Patent Office has become lenient, awarding as 
many as 97% of all applications, some of which appropriate knowledge considered within 
the public domain). 
75. See generally Saunders, Patent Nonuse, supra note 56, at 391-92 (noting that 
technology suppression through patent nonuse--when a patentee fails to commercialize 
the patented product or process--"is not simply a matter of anecdotal fiction or folklore" 
but a "coqtemporary reality"). 
76. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (governing the general conditions of patentability, 
including novelty and non-obvious subject matter). 
77. See id. §§ 1-376. 
78. [d. § 112 (requiring "a written description of the invention, and of the manner 
and process of making and using it"). 
79. [d. § 154. 
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000) (providing that a patent owner's remedy for 
infringement by the federal government is limited to compensatory damages). 
81. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. ColI. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 630 (1999) (holding that Congress did not have the authority to abrogate states' 
immunity from patent infringement claims). 
82. See, e.g., Stephen Buckley, U.S., Brazil Clash Over AIDS Drugs, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 6, 2001, at Al (discussing the clash between strong intellectual property rights and 
the need for generic drugs at low prices). 
HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 580 2002-2003
580 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [39:569 
engaged virtually every human endeavor, it is time to recognize 
that patents do more than measure our nation's economic life. 
They present the possibility of impinging upon personal liberties 
long associated with core social values. This Article next 
considers the ramifications of a postmodern patent system. 
II. PATENTING AND PUBLIC ADVOCACY 
This Article considers three broad categories of patenting to 
demonstrate these libertarian concerns. Issued patents 
appropriating the artifacts and techniques of abortion, 
compliance with the tax laws, and speech are discussed in turn. 
In each of these fields, the work product of the Patent Office is 
allowed to speak for itself; in some cases actual litigation or 
licensing experience informs the inquiry. Part narration and part 
blueprint, this Article considers the place of patenting in a 
strategy for private rulemaking. 
A. Patenting Abortion 
The legislatures of the various states have persistently 
attempted to restrict access to abortion procedures. Some of the 
legislative measures have imposed residency requirements;83 
others have required that a married woman notify her husband 
that she was about to undergo the proceduret still others have 
restricted the performance of a particular abortion technique.85 
Supreme Court rulings addressing such restrictions have come to 
constitute major media events, each one so thoroughly 
scrutinized that they have come to form part of the national legal 
consciousness. 
Less well known is that, alongside state legislatures, the 
Patent Office also has issued what amounts to regulations 
governing the performance of abortions. The roll of granted 
patents includes an extensive array of products and processes for 
causing early termination of pregnancy. Many of these patents 
concern pharmacological compounds. For example, one patent 
instrument claims "a method of terminating pregnancy in 
83. See Andrew J. Ries, Extraterritoriality of Restrictive State Abortion Laws: States 
Can Abort Plans to Abort at Home but Not Abroad, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1209 & n.30 
(1992). 
84. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992) (scrutinizing 
Pennsylvania's abortion law to this effect). 
85. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 4.28 U.S. 52, 75-76 (1976) (discussing 
Missouri's prohibition of saline amniocentesis as an abortion technique after the first 
twelve weeks of pregnancy). 
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mammals" by administering a gonadotropic hormone;86 another a 
method of terminating pregnancy through administration of 
specific esters;87 still another bears the blunt title: "Abortion by 
Myometrial Administration of Prostaglandins.,,88 
Other patents appropriate abortion methodologies in the 
nature of surgical tools and procedures. For example, two related 
patents concern the use of such disposable medical instruments 
as a speculum and a cannula.89 Several others appropriate a 
method of terminating pregnancy prematurely through the use of 
an "abortifacient."9o When presenting claims to the Patent Office, 
patent solicitors have occasionally exhibited a crude awareness of 
judicial developments. Seemingly aware of the now outdated 
trimester approach of Roe v. Wade,91 for example, one 1974 patent 
limited itself to a specified "process for performing an 
abortion ... during approximately the first 24 weeks of 
pregnancy. ,,92 
These patent instruments do more than garnish an 
inventor's wall. Recent experience with the pharmacological 
compound mifepristone demonstrates that patents matter to the 
availability of abortion procedures in the United States. Dr. 
Etienne-Emile Baulieu invented mifepristone in 1980 and 
assigned the patent to his employer, the French firm Roussel 
Uclaf.93 Commonly known as the abortion pill or RU-486, 
mifepristone curbs embryo growth and can cause the abortion of 
early-stage pregnancies.94 Among the significant obstacles to 
marketing mifepristone in the United States was the Roussel 
Uclaf patent.95 Activists eventually succeeded in convincing 
86. U.S. Patent No. 5,356,876 (issued Oct. 18, 1994) ("Methods of Terminating 
Pregnancy"). 
87. U.S. Patent No. 4,073,899 (issued Feb. 14, 1978) ("Method of Terminating 
Pregnancy"). 
88. U.S. Patent No. 3,852,465 (issued Dec. 3, 1974). 
89. U.S. Patent No. 3,835,843 (issued Sept. 17, 1974) ("Medical Instruments"); U.S. 
Patent No. 3,769,980 (issued Nov. 6, 1973) ("Medical Instruments"). 
90. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 3,722,500 (issued Mar. 27, 1973) ("Abortive Device and 
Method"). 
91. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992) (rejecting Roe's 
rigid and unnecessary trimester framework and adopting instead the "undue burden" test 
to scrutinize abortion restrictions before viability). 
92. U.S. Patent No. 3,848,602 (issued Nov. 19, 1974) ("Abortion Facilitating Device 
and Process"). 
93. Leonard A. Cole, Abortions Will Be Moot Soon, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1989, at A17. 
94. See Rachel Zimmerman & Sarah Lueck, FDA Approves the RU-486 Abortion 
Pill, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 2000, at A3 (discussing the ability of RU-486 to terminate 
pregnancies up to seven weeks). 
95. See Sharon Bernstein, Secret Deals, Big Money and Abortion Politics to Bring 
RU-486 to This Country, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 26, 2000, at G1 (describing the Clinton 
Administration's "efforts to persuade Roussel Uclafto either bring the drug to the United 
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Roussel Uclafto assign the mifepristone patent to the Population 
Council,96 a nonprofit organization concerned with reproductive 
health and population growth. 97 The Population Council's 
ownership of the pertinent patent rights was among the factors 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) considered in its 
September 28, 2000, decision approving the sale of mifepristone 
in the United States.98 
Mifepristone might not be available in the United States had 
more politically conservative individuals controlled Roussel 
Uelaf. Had Dr. Baulieu's patent been assigned to say, the 
National Right to Life Committee, it could have insisted it be 
informed about any marketing plans concerning mifepristone. At 
a minimum, the FDA would have been statutorily required to 
delay issuing marketing approval on mifepristone for thirty 
months, or at least until the validity and infringement of the 
patent were judicially determined.99 Although the Population 
Council seems unlikely to part with the mifepristone patent,lOO a 
robust registry of issued patents appropriates other abortion 
techniques and medications. lol The possibility of an anti-abortion 
group purchasing such a patent and using it to restrict access to 
the elaimed invention is a real one. 
Patents may be conceived as a sort of private legislation. Yet 
important distinctions exist between public laws and privately 
held patents concerning abortion procedures. One is that any 
legislatively enacted measure restricting access to abortion 
procedures would be subject to constitutional review. The most 
recent abortion case from the U.S. Supreme Court, Stenberg v. 
Carhart,102 suggests that a blanket restriction on the use of a 
particular abortion technique would be unlikely to survive such 
States or give up its [U.S.) patent rights"). 
96. See id. 
97. See Population Council (detailing the Population Council's mISSIOn and 
accomplishments), at http://www.popcouncil.org/about/about.html (last visited Aug. 10, 
2002). 
98. See Zimmerman & Lueck, supra note 94, at A3 (indicating that the Population 
Council "will conduct studies of the drug after it is marketed and report back to the FDA 
with the results"). 
99. See Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisions for Pharmaceuticals: Have 
They Outlived Their Usefulness?, 39 IDEA 389, 391 & n.6 (1999) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(c) 
(1994) and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)-(4) (1994)). 
100. See Zimmerman & Lueck, supra note 94, at A3 (indicating that the Population 
Council has received grants and loans to develop mifepristone from "prominent investors, 
including foundations set up by Warren Buffett, George Soros and the late David 
Packard"). 
101. Refer to notes 86-88 supra and accompanying text (providing examples of 
patents issued for novel products and processes causing early termination of pregnancy). 
102. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
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oversight. 103 In Stenberg, the Nebraska legislature criminalized 
the performance of a partial-birth abortion, unless the procedure 
was necessary to save the life of the mother. l04 The Supreme 
Court struck down the statute in part because the statute did not 
sufficiently account for the health of the mother .105 The Stenberg 
decision suggests that, at least prior to the viability of the fetus, 
laws restricting access to a particular abortion technique must 
exempt situations where that technique is the safest alternative 
for the pregnant woman. lOG 
Much like the statute in Stenberg, each issued abortion 
patent provides the virtually unfettered right to exclude others 
from using the claimed technique. l07 Yet the possibility of judicial 
imposition of a health-based exception during private patent 
enforcement matters is questionable, to say the least. Neither the 
patent statute nor any issued patent instrument exempts 
individuals from patent infringement based upon their individual 
health needs. Closest is a recently enacted provision declaring 
patents on surgical procedures unenforceable against medical 
practitioners. lOB However, this legislation allows enforcement 
proceedings against individuals not formally licensed to practice 
medicine and in no way restricts the enforcement of patented 
pharmaceuticals, medical devices, or biotechnologies. l09 
Another potential hook within the patent statute is the 
provision governing injunction awards. The Patent Act 
counsels courts to apply traditional equitable principles in 
deciding whether or not to enjoin adjudicated infringers. no 
Although public health concerns would seem to hold a 
103. See id. at 921-22, 938-39 (declaring the Nebraska statute's ban on "partial-
birth abortions," including both dilation and evacuation ("D & E") and dilation and 
extraction ("D & X") procedures, unconstitutional because it imposed an undue burden on 
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy). 
104. [d. at 921-22. 
105. [d. at 922, 931-32. 
106. See id. at 935-38 (reviewing conflicting medical studies on partial-birth abortion 
techniques and concluding that a statutory ban on D & X "creates a significant health 
risk"; therefore, "[tJhe statute ... must contain a health exception" that permits the use of 
D & E as a safer alternative). 
107. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000) (providing the patent owner's right to exclude 
others from specified acts throughout the United States). 
108. [d. § 287(c). 
109. See Brett G. Alten, Left to One's Devices: Congress Limits Patents on Medical 
Procedures, 8 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 837, 840-41 (1998) ("Section 
287(c) precludes a plaintiff from filing a civil action for either monetary damages or 
injunctive relief against a medical practitioner or against a related health care entity for 
performing a 'medical activity."'). 
110. See 35 U.S.C. § 283 ("[AJ ... court [) may grant injunctions in accordance with 
the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such 
terms as the court deems reasonable."). 
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prominent place in such an inquiry, the case law suggests that 
courts focus more strongly upon the patentee's proprietary 
interest. Observing that "the right to exclude recognized in a 
patent is but the essence of the concept of property,,,lll courts 
rely less often on health concerns than the oft-cited admonition 
that "protecting patents from would-be infringers is always 
acting in the public interest.,,112 As explained by one district 
court: 
While the public interest is unquestionably advanced 
through the marketing of potentially lifesaving 
devices ... , Congress has determined it better for the 
nation in the long run to afford the inventors of novel, 
useful and non-obvious products short-term exclusivity 
on such products rather than to permit free competition 
in the goods. Congress has not seen fit to differentiate 
between what might be referred to as lifesaving devices 
and those of a more trivial or less important nature. 
The public interest is served by granting injunctions to 
effectuate patent rights. 113 
With little support from the statute or judicial discretion, 
an accused infringer of a patented medical method or 
technique may seek refuge in the Constitution. Patents on 
abortion methods and devices seemingly raise the identical 
substantive due process issues parsed in Stenberg u. Carhart.114 
However, the ability of a defendant in a patent infringement 
litigation to invoke this guarantee is not entirely clear. 
Constitutional defenses apply only against government 
entities or, under the state action doctrine, nominally private 
parties that enjoy sufficient connections with the 
government. l15 Whether private patentees rise to this level or 
not must be subjected to further analysis. Before turning to 
this issue, this Article considers other patents that implicate 
constitutional values. 
111. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
112. Pittway v. Black & Decker, 667 F. Supp. 585, 593 (N.D. Ill. 1987). 
113. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1439, 1445 (E.D. Pa. 
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
114. 530 U.S. 914, 920-21 (2000) (considering the matter "in light of the 
Constitution's guarantees of fundamental individual liberty"). 
115. See Henry C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 592-93 (1991) ("A litigant seeking the protection of these 
guarantees must establish that the allegedly unconstitutional conduct complained of , may 
fairly be said to be that of the state.'"). 
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B. Patenting Law 
Surely State Street stands among the Federal Circuit's most 
important decisions. 116 Here, the court coolly proclaimed all 
things patentable. l17 It was in State Street that the Federal 
Circuit voided 374 years of common law tradition by declaring 
business methods patentable;1l8 jettisoned controlling legal 
precedent including more finely tuned distinctions regarding the 
patentability of computer software;119 and collapsed the statutory 
subject matter requirement into the more lenient requirement of 
utility. 120 Following State Street, an invention need merely 
achieve a "useful, concrete and tangible result" to be appropriate 
fi t t · 121 or pa en mg. 
The court's string of magisterial pronouncements have 
diverted attention from the nature of the patent enforced in State 
Street. The Federal Circuit described the Signature patene22 as 
claiming "a data processing system ... for implementing an 
investment structure which was developed for use in Signature's 
business as an administrator and accounting agent for mutual 
funds.,,123 The secondary literature has tended to categorize 
Signature's patented invention as software, a computer-
implemented financial product or business method.124 
116. See Gregory J. Maier & Robert C. Mattson, State Street Bank in the Context of 
the Software Patent Saga, 8 GEO. MAsON L. REV. 307, 307-08 (1999) (emphasizing State 
Street's "highly significant" impact on computer-implemented business methods). 
117. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that statutory language "shows Congress's intent not to place 
any restrictions on the subject matter for which a patent may be obtained beyond those 
specifically recited in § 101"; noting the Supreme Court's acknowledgement in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980), "that Congress intended § 101 to extend to 
'anything under the sun that is made by man"'). 
118. Id. at 1375 ("We take this opportunity to lay th[e] ill-conceived ['business 
method'] exception to rest."). . 
119. Id. at 1373-74 (abandoning "the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to determine 
whether the claimed subject matter [is] an unpatentable abstract idea" and establishing 
that patentable subject matter does not become unpatentable "simply because it uses a 
mathematical formula, computer program or digital computer"). 
120. Id. at 1375 (adopting a "practical utility" approach in lieu of a categorical 
approach focused on "the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to--process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"). 
121. Id. at 1373. 
122. U.S. Patent No. 5,193,056 (issued Mar. 9, 1993) ("Data Processing System for 
Hub and Spoke Financial Services Configuration"), cited in State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370. 
123. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370. 
124. See, e.g., Neil F. Carlson, Developing Business Process Patents and Intellectual 
Property, 82 STRATEGIC FIN., Nov. 1, 2000, at 6468 (describing the Signature patent as 
consisting of both a financial structure and a software application), available at 2000 WL 
11723053; Stephen Lesavich, Bioinformatic Tools, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 2000, at B10 
(describing the Signature patent as a business method patent that has enabled the 
biotech industry to protect its inventions with appropriate software patents); Robert 
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Closer scrutiny has revealed that the claims of the Signature 
patent quite closely track prevailing tax laws and Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) regulations. 125 Under current tax law, a 
partnership of pooled stock funds will "[o]rdinarily ... be deemed 
a taxable entity.,,126 Once the profits are distributed to investors, 
personal income tax on the dividends may be owed as well. 127 The 
tax code allows certain master feeder funds to avoid the onus of 
double taxation if the partnership follows certain accounting 
procedures. 128 The tax laws and IRS regulations call for, among 
other steps, the daily allocation of the partnership's profits, 
losses, and expenses. 129 
It is these accounting procedures that are recited, virtually 
word for word, in the claims of the Signature patent. 130 The 
Signature patent does add one additional stricture: the books 
must be maintained via computer. 131 Given the size of most 
pooled-fund partnerships and the complexity of the mandated 
transactions, however, the possibility of an idiot savant poring 
over the accounting books each evening appears remote. In 
practice, these functions must be performed with a computer. As 
observed by Richard Stern, the Signature patent "claim[s], in 
substance, any 'computerized system for complying with 26 
U.S.C. § 706(d)'s requirements for pooled-fund partnerships.",132 
Klinger, Learning How to Play, Win the Patent Game, DALLAS Bus. J., Sept. 15, 2000, at 
8C (describing the Signature patent as a business method patent implementing an 
investment structure). 
125. See Richard H. Stern, Scope-or-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights 
on Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 120-
22 (1999). 
126. Id. at 120-21. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. at 121. 
129. 26 U.S.C. § 706(d)(2)(A) states: 
If during any taxable year of the partnership there is a change in any partner's 
interest in the partnership, then ... each partner's distributive share of any 
allocable cash basis item shall be determined-
(i) by assigning the appropriate portion of such item to each day in the 
period which it is attributable, and 
(ii) by allocating the portion assigned to any such day among the partners in 
proportion to their interests in the partnership at the close of such day. 
26 U.S.C. § 706(d)(2)(A) (2000). 
130. See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 
1371 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (describing the Signature patent as claiming a system that permits 
the daily allocation of multiple mutual funds invested in a single portfolio, providing the 
exact percentage share that each mutual fund holds in the portfolio while accounting for 
daily changes in the values of the mutual fund and the overall portfolio). 
131. See id. 
132. Stern, supra note 125, at 132. 
HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 587 2002-2003
2002] LIBERTY & PROPERTY IN PATENT LAW 587 
The use of patents to restrict access to legal entitlements can 
only be described as an unanticipated and disturbing use of the 
intellectual property laws. Tax law compliance patents are 
potentially only a modest example of the use of private 
instruments to thwart legislative intent to establish a broadly 
applicable law for the benefit of all citizens. For example, 
whatever policy is served through single taxation of pooled-fund 
partnerships, Congress presumably intended that any taxpayer 
might avail itself of these provisions. The tax laws include their 
own detailed set of fines and punishments; providing a private 
actor with exclusionary rights and an additional royalty seems 
counterintuitive at the least. 133 
Despite these apparent concerns, the Federal Circuit has 
actually suggested that the legal enactment of a patented 
invention weighs in favor of the validity of the claim. Explaining 
that the invention claimed by Signature was patentable qua 
software, Judge Rich summarized the holding of State Street in 
one extraordinary passage: 
Today, we hold that the transformation of data, 
representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through 
a series of mathematical calculations into a final share 
price, constitutes a practical application .of a mathematical 
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces "a 
useful, concrete and tangible result"-a final share price 
momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and 
even accepted and relied upon by regulatory authorities and 
in subsequent trades.134 
The patent at issue in State Street should not be understood 
as an isolated incident. Many other patents have issued 
appropriating techniques of tax and regulatory compliance.135 The 
ironic possibilities created by lenient Patent Office practice have 
not been lost on members of the patent bar. In an interesting 
exercise in recursion, two licensed patent attorneys were recently 
named as inventors on a patent claiming a method of drafting a 
patent application.136 Enforcement of any of these patents would 
133. [d. at 133. 
134. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1373 (emphasis added). 
135. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,161,098 (issued Dec. 12,2000) ("Method and Apparatus 
for Enabling Small Investors with a Portfolio of Securities to Manage Taxable Events 
Within the Portfolio"); U.S. Patent No. 6,064,983 (issued May 16, 2000) ("System for 
Performing Tax Computations"); U.S. Patent No. 5,987,474 (issued Nov. 16, 1999) 
("Computer Aided Maintenance and Repair Information System for Equipment Subject to 
Regulatory Compliance"); U.S. Patent No. 5,772,251 (issued June 30, 1998) ("Income Tax 
Information Organizer"). 
136. U.S. Patent No. 6,049,811 (issued Apr. 11, 2000) ("Machine for Drafting a 
Patent Application and Process for Doing Same"). 
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potentially implicate a handful of constitutional values, including 
free speech, due process, and equal protection. As constitutional 
protections extend only against government actors, however, 
their application to patent enforcement matters commenced by 
private parties remains unclear. 137 Before considering the 
doctrine of state action further, this Article further reviews 
patents on speech. 
C. Patenting Speech 138 
In an article published the same year the Federal Circuit 
decided State Street, Professors Mark Lemley and Eugene Volokh 
emphasized that free speech issues arose only rarely with regard 
to the patent statute. 139 They explained that patentees were able 
to prohibit the use or sale of machines, products, and processes-
activities that usually did not concern speech.140 Although Lemley 
and Volokh concluded that courts should be mindful of "certain 
narrow circumstances" that might implicate First Amendment 
concerns, they found the patent law a far less troublesome 
doctrine for proponents of free speech than the copyright law.14l 
A glance through the weekly Patent Office Gazette 
demonstrates how dramatically the ambit of patenting has 
expanded in the few years since Lemley and Volokh wrote their 
article. Many recently issued patents appropriate methods of 
communication. Some patents appropriate communicative 
techniques in the nature of time, place, and manner 
restrictions. 142 Others establish content-based restraints on 
137. Refer to Part III infra (discussing the state action doctrine in the patent 
enforcement context). 
138. This subtitle is used with apologies to Professor Dan Burk, who adopted the 
identical byline in his thoughtful piece discussing the free speech implications of software 
patents. See Dan L. Burk, Patenting Speech, 79 TEX. L. REV. 99 (2000). 
139. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in 
Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 234-36 (1998); see also Andrew 
Beckerman-Rodau, Prior Restraints and Intellectual Property: The Clash Between 
Intellectual Property and the First Amendment From an Economic Perspective, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 33-39 (2001) (explaining that, while "in 
general the patent law does not conflict with the First Anlendment" because "prohibiting 
third parties from making, using, selling or importing a patented invention does not 
involve speech, but rather deals strictly with conduct"; "the patent owner's right to 
prohibit anyone from offering the invention for sale [does] restrict[] commercial 
speech .... which the Supreme Court has viewed as within the domain of the First 
Anlendment free speech protection"). 
140. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 234. 
141. Id. at 237. 
142. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,370,161 (issued Apr. 9, 2002) ("Time Synchronization of 
Distributed Computer Telephony Communication Applications in a Computer Network"); 
U.S. Patent No. 6,351,647 (issued Feb. 26, 2002) ("Location-Dependent Services in a 
Mobile Communication System"); U.S. Patent No. 6,424,840 (issued July 23, 2002) 
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speech. 143 Significantly, although the copyright law has developed 
a nuanced fair use privilege to deal with speech concerns, no such 
defense exists within the patent law. 144 The case can readily be 
made that the patent law allows private actors to impose more 
significant restraints on speech than has ever been possible 
through copyright. 
Internet advertiser DoubleClick's aggressive enforcement of 
its portfolio of electronic commerce patents exemplifies this 
claim. DoubleClick sued two competitors, L90 Inc. and 2417 
Media, to enforce its patent on a "Method of Delivering, 
Targeting, and Measuring Advertising over Networks."145 At the 
last minute the parties settled DoubleClick's infringement claim, 
thereby narrowly avoiding trial.146 Internet service provider Juno 
Online Services, Inc. was not so fortunate. NetZero, Inc. filed suit 
against Juno in federal district court, charging infringement of 
its patented method of displaying advertisements in floating 
windows.147 On January 5, 2001, the court issued a restraining 
order that prohibited Juno from practicing the patented 
invention through March 15, 2001.148 
First Amendment principles were notably absent from the 
DoubleClick case.149 Had a content-neutral law constrained 
speech in the fashion of any of these patents, courts would have 
reviewed the law as a time, place, or manner restriction. This 
analysis would have considered such factors as the existence of 
adequate alternative channels for communication and whether 
the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a specific 
government interest. 15o The courts have yet to subject a patent to 
("Method and System for Dynamic Location-Based Zone Assignment for a Wireless 
Communications Network"). 
143. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,767,893 (issued June 16, 1998) ("Method and Apparatus 
for Content Based Downloading of Video Programs"). 
144. Refer to notes 228-34 infra and accompanying text (discussing the fair use 
privilege in the context of speech cases). . 
145. Thomas, Rulemaker, supra note 73, at 736--37 (citing DoubleClick, L90 Settle 
Patent Lawsuit, NEWSDAY, Nov. 7, 2000, at A44 [hereinafter Doubleclickl, available at 
2000 WL 10042990); see also U.S. Patent No. 5,948,061 (issued Sept. 7, 1999). 
146. Thomas, Rulemaker, supra note 73, at 737 (citing DoubleClick, supra note 145, 
atA44). 
147. Nancy Weil, NetZero Suit Hits Juno with a Restraining Order, INFOWORLD 
DAILY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2001, available at 2001 WL 6585545 [hereinafter Weil, NetZero 
Suit]; see also U.S. Patent No. 6,157,946 (issued Dec. 6, 2000) ("Communication System 
Capable of Providing User with Picture Meeting Characteristics of User and Terminal 
Equipment and Information Providing Device Used for the Same"). 
148. Weil, NetZero Suit, supra note 147. 
149. Thomas, Rulemaker, supra note 73, at 737. 
150. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2, at 791-92 (2d 
ed.1988). 
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similar scrutiny, perhaps out of the belief that constitutional 
limitations on government actions do not apply to patent 
litigation commenced by private parties. 
The advertising patents seem a rather humble lot in 
comparison with other patents that directly regulate the content 
of speech. Patented voter and consumer surveying techniques are 
among this more troublesome group. One recently issued patent, 
directed towards a "method of administering a survey," 
appropriates in part the steps of '~transmitting the respondent 
question to the respondent" and "receiving a response from the 
respondent."151 Since the Federal Circuit issued State Street, 
marketing and sales techniques have also been subjected to 
private appropriation. One such patent, relating to home 
improvement, includes the step of "presenting the design ideas to 
a client" as part of the claimed invention. 152 The number of 
patents on personal instruction is also impressive. For example, 
individuals have patented methods of teaching language,153 
. 154 b 1 . 't' 155 d' 1 't' 156 d musIC, voca u ary acqUlsl lOn, la ogue wn lng, an 
mathematics.157 
Government regulation of the communicative impact of 
expression is ordinarily subjected to strict scrutiny.158 Only those 
regulations that are narrowly tailored and necessary to serve a 
compelling state interest will be upheld. 159 Yet all indications 
from the courts are that privately held patents offer their owners 
the ability to suppress or punish speech without reference to 
these limitations. 16o 
151. U.S. Patent No. 6,093,026 (issued July 25, 2000) ("Method and Apparatus for 
Administering a Survey"). 
152. U.S. Patent No. 5,668,736 (issued Sept. 16, 1997) ("Method for Designing and 
Illustrating Architectural Enhancements to Existing Buildings"). 
153. U.S. Patent No. 5,649,826 (issued July 22, 1997) ("Method and Device for 
Teaching Language"). 
154. U.S. Patent No. 6,015,947 (issued Jan. 18,2000) ("Method of Teaching Music"). 
155. U.S. Patent No. 6,120,297 (issued Sept. 19, 2000) (''Vocabulary Acquistion [sic] 
Using Structured Inductive Reasoning"). 
156. U.S. Patent No. 5,102,338 (issued Apr. 7, 1992) ("Method for Training Children 
in the Art of Dialogue Writing"). 
157. U.S. Patent No. 6,155,836 (issued Dec. 5, 2000) ("System for Teaching 
Mathematics"). 
158. TRIBE, supra note 150, § 12-2, at 791-92. Professor Tribe further notes that 
government regulation directed at the "communicative impact" of an act is considered 
unconstitutional unless the government demonstrates "that the message being 
suppressed poses a 'clear and present danger,' constitutes a defamatory falsehood, or 
otherwise falls on the unprotected side of one of the lines the Court has drawn to 
distinguish those expressive acts privileged by the first amendment from those open to 
government regulation with only minimal due process scrutiny." [d. 
159. [d. § 12-2, at 796. 
160. Refer to notes 161-66 infra and accompanying text (discussing two recent 
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Even where the patent does not itself claim speech, freedom 
of expression issues have arisen in other ways with respect to the 
patent system. Patentees have become increasingly active 
against individuals who criticize their proprietary interests. Two 
patent infringement lawsuits reported on the website of The 
Intellectual Property Owners Association, a public advocacy 
organization which principally represents patent owners, are 
notable for the free speech issues that they raise. 161 Noted 
Washington, D.C. lawyer and educator Harold C. Wegner serves 
as the defendant in one patent infringement lawsuit. 162 The 
plaintiff, Martin Gardner Reiffin, does not contend that Wegner 
made, used, or sold the patented invention. Instead, in the words 
of the Federal Circuit, Reiffin's "suit alleged that Wegner 
conspired with Microsoft [Corporation] to undermine the value of 
Reiffin's patents and libeled Reiffin by making statements to his 
law school class and publishing articles on his Internet site that 
referred to Reiffin's patents as 'submarine patents."'163 
Techsearch L.L.C. filed the second of these suits on July 31, 
2000, in part against outspoken patent critic Gregory 
Aharonian. 164 Techsearch bills itself as "a privately held company 
engaged in the business of buying, owning, and licensing patents 
and patent interests, including pending applications.,,165 Like 
Wegner, Aharonian has apparently never made, used, or sold the 
invention that is the subject of the patent-in-suit. Instead, the 
Techsearch complaint charges that "Aharonian has collected, sold 
and distributed alleged prior art concerning [Techsearch's] '341 
Federal Circuit decisions in which patent owners filed patent infringement suits to 
suppress speech). 
161. See Intellectual Property Owners Association, IPO Daily News, (Aug. 24 & 28, 
2000) (reporting on the status of pending suits involving Reiffin and Techsearch), at 
http://www.ipo.org/DailyNewsChron2000.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002). 
162. Id. 
163. In re Reiffin, No. 624 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 14, 2000), available at WL 1229009, *1. A 
commentator has explained that: 
Submarine patents are simple in concept. An inventor or the inventor's attorney 
files an application with broad claims ... and then files a series of continuing 
applications to keep the patent submerged in the patent office; then, one day, 
someone innocently decides to use the yet to be patented idea, and after they 
begin production, the inventor surfaces the application through its issuance, and 
demands the payment of royalties, lest a lawsuit will be filed for infringement. 
Steve Blount, The Use of Delaying Tactics to Obtain Submarine Patents and Amend 
Around a Patent that a Competitor Has Designed Around, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC'y 11, 13 (1999). 
164. Intellectual Property Owners Association, IPO Daily News (Aug. 24, 2000), at 
http://www.ipo.org/DailyNewsChron2000.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002). 
165. Techsearch, About Techsearch, at http://www.techsearch-llc.comlabouttxt.html 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2002). 
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patent and has publicly challenged the validity and enforceability 
of the '341 patent."166 
Stories such as these provide a saddening account of the 
state of contemporary patent law. A critic of enacted legislation 
or administrative action would normally be considered a 
concerned citizen. Yet leading members of the patent community 
both sue and have been sued for criticizing what amounts to a 
federal regulation. These episodes remind us that patents 
combine the attributes of public regulation and private property. 
These dual attributes continue to prompt the same disturbing 
question: May a patent restrict personal liberties in ways that 
legislation cannot? Through examples, this Article next considers 
the applicability of constitutional defenses to patent 
infringement. 
III. PATENT ENFORCEMENT AS STATE ACTION 
Patents that appropriate abortion procedures, parrot federal 
law, or suppress speech, are among those that implicate 
constitutionally guaranteed rights. 167 Yet whether an accused 
patent infringer may assert a constitutional defense is not 
entirely clear. The Constitution's guarantees of individual liberty 
apply, with a few exceptions, only against the government. 16B 
When a private entity serves as the plaintiff-patentee in an 
ordinary infringement suit, an accused infringer may find resort 
to the Constitution unavailing. 
Resolution of this issue turns upon the state action doctrine. 
Under the state action doctrine, constitutional guarantees may 
restrict the conduct of private parties if that conduct is 
sufficiently entwined with a governmental entity.169 The Supreme 
Court has identified numerous factors that bear upon whether 
private conduct can fairly be attributed to the state.170 When the 
166. Intellectual Property Owners Association, IPO Daily News (Aug. 24, 2000), at 
http://www.ipo.org/DailyNewsChron2000.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2002). 
167. Refer to Part ILA supra (providing an in-depth discussion on "patenting 
abortion"). 
168. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) ("[T!he First and 
Fourteenth Amendments safeguard the rights of free speech and assembly by limitations 
on state action, not on action by the owner of private property used nondiscriminatorily 
for private purposes only."). See generally Strickland, supra note 115, at 592 ("In essence, 
the Constitution governs American governments-not Americans."). 
169. Refer to note 115 supra and accompanying text (indicating that sufficient 
connections with government are required). 
170. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (declaring that "fair 
attribution" of an act to the state requires that (1) "the deprivation must be caused by the 
exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by 
[the State! or by a person for whom [the State! is responsible," and (2) "the party charged 
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nominally private party performs a traditional government 
function,l71 is controlled by a state entity/72 or engages in conduct 
that has been encouraged or substantially facilitated by the 
government,l73 then the constitutional guarantees will apply.174 
That the state action doctrine has been subjected to extreme 
criticism should be noted from the outset. 175 Positive law theorists 
teach that the government is the fountainhead of all personal 
rights.176 Within positivism, an attempt to distinguish the public 
from the private lacks coherency from the outset. 177 Rights 
scholars from other disciplines observe that in practice, in every 
lawsuit asserting a private violation of rights, courts must choose 
either to allow the violation to continue or to intervene in order 
to prevent the violation. 17B From this perspective, state actors are 
wholly incapable of exempting themselves from responsibility for 
ensuring individualliberties.179 
Other commentators have found the· state action doctrine 
more appealing. lBo The notion that private individuals somehow 
with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor"). 
171. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149; 161-63 (1978) (declining to extend the 
state action doctrine beyond "such functions as education, fire and police protection, and 
tax collection" to "the function of so-called 'dispute resolution'" or "the field of private 
commercial transactions"). 
172. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 394-400 (1995) 
(determining that the National Railroad Passenger Corp. (Amtrak), statutorily created 
and controlled by the government, is an agency of the government rather than an 
independent entity and therefore should not be able to evade constitutional guarantees). 
173. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-76, 378-81 (1967) (holding that a 
California constitutional provision that prohibited the state from denying property owners 
an unfettered right to decline to sell, lease, or rent real property to particular persons, 
resulted in unconstitutional state authorization of private, racial discrimination in the 
housing market). 
174. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 290-93, 
302 (2001) (declaring that the regulatory enforcement proceeding initiated by the state 
interscholastic athletic association, a private organization, against one of its private 
members, constituted state action largely based on the association's entwinement with 
the government, which characterized it as a public entity subject to constitutional 
guarantees). 
175. E.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. u. L. REV. 503,504-
05 (1985) (challenging the state action doctrine as unworkable, inconsistent, and 
irrational). 
176. [d. at 520,527 ("Under positivism all rights are derived from the government."). 
177. [d. at 527. "There is no inherently private realm of individual behavior." [d. 
"Everything that is allowed occurs because of the state's decision not to prohibit the 
activity." [d. "Thus, all private violations of liberty occur because they are sanctioned by 
the state's common law, and hence by state action." [d. 
178. See generally David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 
(1999) (commenting that courts apply constitutional guarantees to the activity of some 
actors while withholding the same guarantees from similar actors engaged in similar 
activity). 
179. See id. at 1262-63. 
180. Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Case note on Flagg Bros. v. 
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wield the power of the state in their everyday activities has been 
described as "conspicuously artificial" and "disquietingly 
totalitarian."181 Supporters have suggested that the state action 
doctrine both preserves a zone of individual freedom and 
prevents the imposition of liability upon the government for 
private acts. 182 Experience teaches us as well that constitutional 
provisions are broadly drawn and susceptible to dilution. By 
preventing routine litigation from directly invoking our highest 
governmental principles, the state action doctrine is said to 
ensure the availability of robust constitutional principles in cases 
of great moment. 183 
This Article does not· seek to add another plank to either 
state action platform. The patent law seems most unlikely to 
serve as the rudder for lending order to a state action doctrine 
that has so far avoided a coherent explanation. The ambition of 
this Article is merely to assess whether a court is likely to hold 
that a patent enforcement litigation commenced by a private 
party sufficiently involves the state. If so, constitutional defenses 
may yet play a role in patent infringement proceedings. If not, 
then the sobering reality is that constitutional values may not be 
able to contribute directly to restricting the current excesses of 
our patent system. 
A. Patent Fundamentals and State Action 
Salient features of the patent law point in conflicting 
directions concerning state action. Some patent law 
fundamentals support the conclusion that private patent 
enforcement constitutes state action. Unlike other intellectual 
Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1330 (1982) (positing that the state action doctrine 
"servers] an important ideological function: it reflects and reinforces the ideas of natural 
spheres of individual autonomy and a natural regime of property rights"). 
181. Frank 1. Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a 
Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1338 (1982). 
182. See Peter M. Shane, The Rust that Corrodes: State Action, Free Speech, and 
Responsibility, 52 LA. L. REV. 1585, 1587 (1992). 
183. E.g., William P. Marshall, Diluting Constitutional Rights: Rethinking 
"Rethinking State Action," 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 558, 564 (1985). Professor Marshall's 
critique of Professor Chemerinsky's Rethinking State Action extends to Chemerinsky's 
theory of adopting a balancing approach under the state action doctrine. [d. Marshall 
argues that: 
[d. 
If one constitutional right is embattled against another, the protection accorded 
one liberty is going to be diminished. The courts will be forced to articulate 
priorities in constitutional liberties, with the result that certain liberties 
eventually might be found to possess only secondary constitutional significance. 
This in turn may lead to less protection being accorded these rights, even in 
cases involving "pure" state action. 
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property rights, patent rights arise only through direct 
government intervention on an individual basis. Inventors who 
seek patent protection are obliged to prepare applications and 
place them before the Patent Office.184 There, examiners review 
each application on its individual merits and choose either to 
reject the application or allow it to issue as a granted patent. 185 
The ability to issue letters patent is exclusive to the federal 
government.186 In contrast to copyright and trademark, no 
common law patent rights have ever existed in the United 
States.187 
Augmenting the case for private patent enforcement as state 
action is the notion that issued patents are inherently bound up 
in the federal judiciary. The award of patent provides its 
proprietor with nothing more than a grant to accuse others of 
infringement in the federal courtS.188 Patentees obtain no 
affirmative right to practice the claimed invention, or indeed any 
other grant or privilege whatsoever.189 Any exercise of patent 
rights necessarily involves the formal invocation of government 
apparatus. Patents can be licensed, of course, but the license is 
"nothing more than a promise by the licensor not to sue the 
licensee.,,19o 
Patentees also appear to enjoy a symbiotic relationship with 
the government. The patent system benefits the government by 
creating a private class of innovators without resort to subsidy 
from the public fiSC. 191 Inventors in turn obtain an exclusive 
184. 35 U.S.C. § 111 (2000) ("An application for patent shall be made, or authorized 
to be made, by the inventor, except as otherwise provided in this title, in writing to the 
Director."). 
185. See id. § 131 ("The Commissioner shall cause an examination to be made of the 
application and the alleged new invention; and if on such examination it appears that the 
applicant is entitled to a patent under the law, the Commissioner shall issue a patent 
therefore. "). 
186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 8. 
187. Darren W. Saunders, Doing Deals 2002: Understanding the Nuts & Bolts of 
Transactional Practice in an Uncertain Market, 1295 PLIICORP. 551, 555-57 (2002) 
("Patents are governed solely by the U.S. Patent Act; there is no common law .... "). 
188. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for 
infringement of his patent."). 
189. C. Edward Polk, Jr. & Jonathan R. Spivey, Patent Law Basics: Understanding 
the United States Patent System, 15 NAT'L BA MAG. 16, 16 (2001) (emphasizing that the 
most fundamental aspect of a patent is that it "provides the right to exclude others, not 
the right to make, use, offer for sale, or sell the patented invention"). 
190. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr, Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer 
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 829 F.2d 1075, 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
191. See Robert D. Katz et aI., Advancing Claim Drafting and Amendment Writing 
for Chemical Inventions, 585 PLIIPAT. 339, 343 (1999) (describing the "'quid pro quo' 
[relationship) . .. between the inventor and the government" in which "the inventor 
discloses his or her invention to the public and receives in exchange a grant, by the 
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authority bound up in governmental authority.192 It would seem 
appropriate that patentees accept constitutional responsibility 
for an elevation in status that is voluntarily chosen. 
On the other hand, patent enforcement may be considered as 
essentially private in character. The decision to commence patent 
litigation is wholly discretionary to the patent proprietor. 193 The 
Patent Act, which does not regulate the conduct of patentees in 
any manner, certainly does not compel individuals to enforce 
their patents in a manner offensive . to protected individual 
liberties. 194 Among the entities a patentee might choose to charge 
with a patent infringement action is the federal government 
itself. 195 Over the years, the United States has parted with 
millions of dollars in patent royalty fees and adverse judgments 
from the Court of Federal Claims.196 With patentees frequently 
playing the role of adversary to the state, identification of the 
patent holder as a state actor seems difficult to countenance. 197 
Both the Patent Act and our experience also reflect the 
private nature of patent enforcement. The Patent Act informs us 
that patents possess "the attributes of personal property," not 
state regulation. 19B Recognition that virtually every large 
corporation doing business in the United States is a patentee199 
also tempers enthusiasm for identifying patentees as state 
government of the right to exclude others," thereby encouraging individuals and 
companies "to invest substantial sums of capital in the development of the invention"). 
192. [d. 
193. Refer to note 188 supra and accompanying text (indicating that the patent 
holder also holds the right to sue for infringement). 
194. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841 (1982) (holding that a private 
high school's decisions to discharge teachers "were not compelled or even influenced by 
any state regulation"). 
195. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) states in relevant part: 
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United 
States is used or manufactured by or for· the Unite.d States without license of the 
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's 
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court 
of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for 
such use and manufacture. 
28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). 
196. See, e.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1966) (upholding patent 
validity and thereby affirming the judgment to award the patent owner compensation for 
the government's use of the patented invention). 
197. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (agreeing that a public 
defender does not ordinarily act under "color of state law" in part because "a defense 
lawyer characteristically opposes the designated representatives of the State"). 
198. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000). 
199. Cf John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 V AND. L. REV. 2099, 2116--17 (2000) (disclosing that 
large corporations are being granted the "overwhelming majority" of issued patents). 
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actors. To do so would essentially convert the entire commercial 
world into the government. 
Proponents of either view of the patent system200 appear to 
have much doctrine at their disposal. In the face of these 
competing factors, state action precedents would seemingly 
contribute to the resolution of whether patent litigation 
inevitably involves state action. In fact, the cases offer no easy 
answers. The state action doctrine has been described as 
confused, inconsistent, and hopelessly incoherent,201 but in the 
area of intellectual property enforcement, the precedent presents 
a true puzzle. In a line of state action cases considering state-
sponsored monopolies and license holders, a status akin to that of 
the patent holder, the pronounced tendency is for the Supreme 
Court to reject the application of constitutional defenses.202 Yet 
the Court has issued two decisions, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting CO. 203 and Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterprises,204 that feature lengthy substantive discussions of the 
First Amendment in connection with the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.205 Neither opinion presents even a 
preliminary discussion of state action doctrine. In an attempt to 
determine the role of the Bill of Rights in the patent law, this 
Article parses in sequence these competing strains of case law. 
B. The Licensing Cases 
Cases concerning state-sponsored licensees and monopolies 
suggest that the Court has been loathe to classify such 
enterprises as state actors. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,206 for 
example, the Court held that the mere fact that a state grants a 
license-in that case, a liquor license to a private club-does not 
transform the licensee into a state actor.207 In Jackson v. 
Metropolitan Edison Co. ,208 the Court went further, refusing to 
apply due process rights against an electrical utility for 
disconnecting a customer's service without notice and fair 
200. Refer to notes 175-83 supra and accompanying text (exploring the views of the 
proponents and opponents of the state action doctrine). 
201. Chemerinsky, supra note 175, at 527; Marshall, supra note 183, at 558. 
202. Refer to notes 206-16 infra and accompanying text (detailing the licensing 
cases). 
203. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
204. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
205. See id. at 555-60; Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 569-79. 
206. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). 
207. [d. at 165, 177. 
208. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). 
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hearing. 209 The Court concluded that although utilities enjoy 
monopoly status and are heavily regulated, their actions were 
not attributable to the state.210 These holdings strongly suggest 
that patentees, who receive a government-sponsored monopoly 
but are otherwise unregulated, would not count as state actors 
either. 
A third decision, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. 
Olympic Committee,211 also seems damaging to the assertion that 
intellectual property enforcement exercises necessarily invoke 
state action. This case involved the congressional gifting of the 
exclusive right to use the word "Olympic" to the U.S. Olympic 
Committee.212 The Committee brought suit against San Francisco 
Arts & Athletics, Inc. (SFAA), seeking to restrain SFAA's use of 
the word "Olympic" to describe an athletic competition that it 
sponsored.213 The Court rejected SF AA's facial challenge to the 
federal law under the First Amendment.214 The Court declined to 
reach SFAA's Fifth Amendment argument, however, reasoning 
that the Committee was not a state actor.215 According to the 
Court, the Committee's "choice of how to enforce its exclusive 
right to use the word 'Olympic' simply is not a governmental 
decision."216 
If neither the Moose Lodge, Metropolitan Edison, nor the 
U.S. Olympic Committee are state actors, then a private citizen 
with standing to assert patent rights likely does not qualify 
either. Patentees are subject to considerably less government 
entwinement than any of these other entities. Individual 
decisions to procure patent rights, as well as to commence 
enforcement proceedings, are both freely theirs. That no judicial 
decision has yet applied a constitutional defense to patent 
infringement also seems telling. Perhaps the constitutional 
argument was unable to shelter accused infringers because the 
patent law traditionally implicated economic rather than liberty 
interests; but equally plausible is the rationale that all the 
players believed that patentees were unlikely to be judged state 
actors. 
This chain of reasoning leads to a startling result. It is 
entirely possible that a court may strike down legislation as 
209. [d. at 347, 358-59. 
210. [d. at 351-53. 
211. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
212. [d. at 524, 526 & n.4. 
213. [d. at 526-27. 
214. [d. at 531-32, 540. 
215. [d. at 543-45. 
216. [d. at 547. 
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violative of the Constitution, but enforce an identically worded 
patent held by a private party. That a Nebraska legislator, 
displeased with Stenberg v. Carhart,217 could procure and found a 
lawsuit upon a patent claiming a partial-birth abortion technique 
seems wholly incongruous. Yet numerous patents have already 
issued on methods of performing abortions, and after State 
Street,218 no meaningful limits upon the scope of patentable 
subject matter exist. Concerns should only be heightened by the 
realizations that patented speech has already been the subject of 
a prior restraint and that litigation has already commenced on a 
patent that tracks the precise words offederallegislation.219 
The licensing cases are not the only ones bearing upon the 
state action implications of patent litigation, however. Other 
precedent,22o and a substantial academic literature,221 explore the 
First Amendment implications of enforcing copyrights and the 
right of publicity. This line of decisions casts a more hopeful light 
on the application of constitutional protections during patent 
enforcement. Contrast between these decisions and the licensing 
cases seems more to highlight the doctrinal confusion that 
permeates the state action doctrine, however, than to relieve it. 
C. The Speech Cases 
In its first decision balancing intellectual property rights 
and the First Amendment, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting CO.,222 the U.S. Supreme Court considered a cause 
of action for a violation of the "right of publicity.,,223 The action 
was brought by none other than a performer in a human 
cannonball show, who claimed that a television station had aired 
his act without permission.224 The Ohio Supreme Court had held 
217. 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (finding a Nebraska statute, which criminalized partial-
birth abortions, unconstitutional). Refer also to notes 102-09 supra and accompanying 
text (discussing the case). 
218. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (finding that any practical and useful invention 
is eligible for a patent). Refer also to notes 22-33 supra and accompanying text 
(discussing the case and its impact). 
219. Refer to notes 125-32 supra and accompanying text (indicating that the claims 
of State Street's Signature patent closely track federal tax laws and IRS regulations). 
220. Refer to notes 222-60 infra and accompanying text (analyzing notable speech 
cases that balance intellectual property and First Amendment rights). 
221. For one compilation of citations to the academic literature, see Malia Pollack, 
The Right to Know?: Delimiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce 
Clause, the Intellectual Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 47, 66 n.100 (1999). 
222. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
223. Id. at 565. 
224. Id. at 563-64. 
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for the broadcaster based upon the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.225 Following a lengthy substantive discussion, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments did not impinge upon the asserted 
constitutional rights in that case.226 Justice White's decision did 
not stop to qualify human cannonball performance artists as 
state actors against whom these constitutional provisions 
presumably would apply.227 
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprisei28 is to 
similar effect. There the Court frequently mentioned First 
Amendment concerns while deciding that the unauthorized use 
of President Ford's memoirs was not a fair use under the 
Copyright Act. 229 As in Zacchini, both the copyright owner, Time 
Magazine, and the accused infringer, The Nation, were private 
actors. Once more the Court remained silent on the state action 
. 230 Issue. 
These two cases have founded the conclusions of numerous 
commentators that enforcement of any copyright necessarily 
involves the First Amendment. 231 These holdings are more 
slippery than they may seem on first reading, however. A careful 
review of Harper & Row reveals that while the Court refers 
repeatedly to "First Amendment values," it carefully avoids 
reliance upon the First Amendment itself.232 The Court actually 
decided Harper & Row based upon the fair use privilege codified 
at § 107 of the Copyright Act. 233 Zacchini is more difficult to 
225. See id. at 565-66, 569 (citing the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that the 
broadcaster is "constitutionally privileged to include in its newscast matters of public 
interest that would otherwise be protected by the right of publicity, absent an intent to 
injure or to appropriate for some nonprivileged purpose"). 
226. [d. at 578-79. 
227. [d. at 566-79 (failing to discuss whether the "right of publicity" implicates the 
state action doctrine); see also Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 
F.3d 959, 968 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that private enforcement of the right of publicity 
constitutes state action). 
228. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
229. [d. at 555-60, 569. 
230. [d. (failing to discuss whether the "right of publicity" implicates the state action 
doctrine). 
231. E.g., Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 185 n.179 ("There's no doubt that a 
court's enforcement of copyright law to restrict private speech constitutes state action."). 
232. See Harper & Row, 471· U.S. at 555-60, 569 (reversing and remanding 
"[b]ecause we find that The Nation's use of ... verbatim excerpts from the unpublished 
manuscript was not a fair use"). 
233. See id. at 560-69. The fair use doctrine is defined as "[a] privilege in other than 
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without 
the owner's consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner." BLACK'S LAw 
DICTIONARY 415 (6th ed. 1991). The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107, expressly provides for 
the balancing ofthe following four factors to determine whether the use was fair: "(1) the 
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distinguish, but it is notable that in neither case were 
constitutional defenses successfu1.234 Under such circumstances, 
the Court's substantive discussions could be dismissed as dicta. 
Recognizing the limitations of Harper & Rowand Zacchini, 
proponents of a role for the Constitution in intellectual property 
enforcement usually turn quickly to New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.235 In that case, the Alabama Supreme Court had 
affirmed the award of a $500,000 judgment to a Montgomery city 
official following a libel action against the New York Times.236 
The basis for the asserted libel was a published advertisement on 
behalf of the civil rights movement.237 Prior to overturning the 
judgment on First Amendment grounds, the Court reached the 
state action issue by explaining that "[a]lthough this is a civil 
lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have 
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose 
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech 
and press.,,238 This sweeping view of state action suggests not only 
that the First Amendment applies to copyright and patent cases, 
but that the entire gamut of constitutional protections applies to 
the enforcement of all private rights under facially neutral laws. 
Whether New York Times v. Sullivan enjoys this reach or 
not bears further consideration. That decision's reasoning seems 
rooted in the reasoning of Shelley v. Kraemer,239 a perplexing 
decision that appears of marginal precedential value today. 
There the Shelleys, an Mrican-American family, purchased 
property that was subject to a private restrictive covenant 
forbidding the sale of the property to non-white persons.240 
Owners of similarly restricted lots brought suit to prevent the 
purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; [andl (4) 
the effect on the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." Harper & Row, 
471 U.S. at 560--61. 
234. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (refusing to extend the fair use doctrine in 
light of the First Amendment protections already embodied in the Copyright Act); 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 564--66, 578-79 (1997) (declining to 
grant First or Fourteenth Amendment protection to the broadcasting company that aired 
an entertainer's performance without his consent). 
235. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
236. [d. at 256. 
237. [d. at 256-58 (reproducing statements from the March 29, 1960, advertisement 
in the New York Times entitled "Heed Their Rising Voices," which described a "wave of 
terror" that allegedly denied southern African-American students some of their 
constitutional rights and allegedly libeled a public official when it implicitly referred to 
him as "police"). 
238. [d. at 265. 
239. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
240. [d. at 4-5. 
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Shelleys from taking possession of their property.241 Choosing to 
enforce the private covenants, the Supreme Court of Missouri 
enjoined the Shelleys from occupying their property.242 The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court and held that 
judicial enforcement of private restrictive covenants constitutes 
state action. 243 The Court went on to find the restrictive covenant 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.244 
Although the Shelley v. Kraemer Court has been admired for 
its willingness to reach the correct result, its reasoning has been 
viewed with suspicion virtually from the day the decision was 
announced. 245 Many commentators found it unjust to implicate 
the state with impermissible discrimination for merely giving 
effect to a contract freely made by a private party.246 The Court 
has not expressly overruled Shelley v. Kraemer in the intervening 
years, but its holding has been severely marginalized.247 Its 
outcome appears a product of its times, the result of "the unique 
problems of racial discrimination and the balance of substantive 
rights at issue.,,248 For many, the advent of civil rights legislation 
soon rendered the Court's ambitious view of state action 
unnecessary and undesirable.249 Some commentators have 
suggested that Shelley v. Kraemer can literally be confined to its 
precise facts, with its precedential value limited "to preventing 
judicial enforcement of racially restricted covenants.,,250 
241. [d. at 6. 
242. [d. (concluding that enforcement of the restrictive covenant excluding persons of 
a designated race or color "violated no rights guaranteed... by the Federal 
Constitution"). 
243. [d. at 18-20, 23 (observing that, "but for the active intervention of the state 
courts, supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to 
occupy the properties in question without restraint"). 
244. [d. at 20-21. 
245. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. 
L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1959). 
246. E.g., id. at 29; cf Shelley Ross Saxer, Shelley v. Kraemer's Fiftieth Anniversary: 
A Time for Keeping; A Time for Throwing Away?, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 61, 82-84 (1998) 
(acknowledging criticism that Shelley v. Kraemer's expansive view of state action may 
destroy the doctrine altogether because of its potential application to all private action). 
247. See, e.g., John Devlin, Construing an Alternative to "State Action" as a Limit on 
State Constitutional Rights Guarantees: A Survey, Critique and Proposal, 21 RUTGERS 
L.J. 819, 838 n.92 (1990) (observing that even though Shelley v. Kraemer has not been 
expressly overruled, courts have generally not applied its principle outside the context of 
race discrimination). 
248. [d. 
249. See Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural 
Value of Applying Constitutional Norms to "Private" Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 
1263, 1284-86 (2000) (noting that the pressure mounting in the 1950s and 1960s 
regarding the state action doctrine has since dissipated). 
250. Kenneth M. Casebeer, The Empty State and Nobody's Market: The Political 
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The downfall of Shelley v. Kraemer may leave New York 
Times v. Sullivan without much vitality. For what is New York 
Times v. Sullivan but Shelley v. Kraemer attached to a different 
constitutional amendment?251 In both cases, the plaintiff 
employed a facially neutral law that offered no special status for 
state officials. 252 Whatever constitutional excesses have been 
attributed to the holding of Shelley v. Kraemer must surely apply 
to New York Times v. Sullivan as well.253 
New York Times v. Sullivan might have served as a 
conventional state action case.254 Sullivan was, after all, a 
Montgomery city official. 255 Perhaps the case could have 
established libel law only for "public officials [acting] in their 
official capacity.,,256 The difficulty with this reasoning is that soon 
after issuing New York Times v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court 
expanded its reasoning not just to public officials, but to public 
figures as well.257 With Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts ,258 the 
Supreme Court created another constitutional conundrum akin 
to Shelley v. Kraemer. 259 A handful of decisions have recognized 
this outcome, citing New York Times v. Sullivan as support for 
an ambitious scope of the state action doctrine.260 Little doubt 
Economy of Non-Responsibility and the Judicial Disappearing of the Civil Rights 
Movement, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 247,291 (2000); see also Saxer, supra note 246, at 119-20 
(arguing that unless Shelley v. Kraemer is restricted to "racially discriminatory private 
covenants," it will destroy the state action doctrine by converting "all private action to 
public action whenever a private litigant attempts to judicially enforce a private right"). 
251. See Martin A. Schwartz & Erwin Chemerinsky, Dialogue on State Action, 16 
TOURO L. REV. 775, 791 (2000) (opining that New York Times v. Sullivan "was [merely] a 
private defamation suit, a private individual against the New York Times, a private 
entity"). 
252. Kevin L. Cole, Federal and State "State Action": The Undercritical Embrace of a 
Hypercriticized Doctrine, 25 GA. L. REV. 327, 353 (1990) ("Though Shelley and Sullivan 
might theoretically have broad impact, the Court's refusal to so read those cases may now 
be sufficiently clear that the cases can fairly be considered to be limited to their facts."). 
253. James Boyle, The First Amendment and Cyberspace: The Clinton Years, 63 LAw 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 337, 340 (2000) (exposing the tenuous argument for finding state 
action in New York Times v. Sullivan). 
254. See Joseph H. Sommer, Against Cyberlaw, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1145, 1200 
n.201 (2000) (asserting that New York Times v. Sullivan "was a conventional state action 
case, because it was restricted to public officials in their official capacity," but soon "was 
expanded to public figures"). 
255. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,256 (1964). 
256. Sommer, supra note 254, at 1200 n.201. 
257. [d. 
258. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
259. Sommer, supra note 254, at 1200 n.201. 
260. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) ("Our cases teach 
that the application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict 
First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment."); 
Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 880 (9th Cir. 1987) 
("State laws whether statutory or common law, including tort rules, constitute state 
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should remain that following New York Times v. Sullivan, the 
First Amendment would justly be in play in litigation involving 
patent rights that restricted speech. Presumably, an accused 
infringer would argue that other constitutional protections, such 
as due process or equal protection, should apply as well. 
We are left, then, with competing lines of cases that suggest 
different outcomes for determining whether state action inheres 
in patent enforcement. Reconciliation of these cases, always a 
perilous exercise in state action, reveals two possible 
explanations for the more liberal view of state action in the 
speech cases than in the licensing cases. Interestingly, while 
these rationalizations affirm the place of the First Amendment in 
copyright infringement cases, they seem of limited applicability 
to patents. 
One way to bring the speech and licensing cases to terms 
rests on the recognition that, along with libel and obscenity laws, 
copyright and the right of publicity intimately concern speech.261 
Both intellectual property laws potentially prevent individuals 
from writing, composing, making public displays, or dancing as 
they wish.262 Not only do both bodies of law restrict the ability of 
speakers to say what they want; constraining speech is all that 
they do. 263 When the First Amendment forbids laws abridging the 
freedom of speech, surely copyright and the right of publicity are 
included.264 
Recognition of the essential nature of the right to freedom of 
expression serves as the second basis for reconciling the licensing 
and speech cases. Along with other cases implicating 
fundamental . rights, the speech cases present circumstances 
where courts are simply more willing to find state action. 265 
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Metropolitan Edison, argued for a 
action."). 
261. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 165-66, 225 (noting that copyright law 
restricts freedom of speech and that some courts have been willing to acknowledge the 
First Amendment conflict in the right of publicity context, particularly the dangers of 
prior restraint). 
262. See id. at 165--66, 224-26. 
263. Id. at 166, 224-28 (suggesting that copyright and right of publicity laws 
generally restrict speech because copyright laws not only apply to creative adaptation but 
also to literal copying, and because "likeness" is so broadly construed under the right of 
publicity laws). 
264. Id. at 182-83 (observing that characterization of a speech restriction as an 
"intellectual property law" will not withdraw it from the scope of First Amendment 
protections); see also Jackson v. Metro Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974) (observing 
that the scope of the monopoly regulated by the state in that case, namely an electric 
utility, had little to do with the constitutional due process violation asserted). 
265. Refer to notes 222-60 supra and accompanying text (analyzing speech cases 
with respect to the state action doctrine). 
HeinOnline -- 39 Hous. L. Rev. 605 2002-2003
2002] LIBERTY & PROPERTY IN PATENT LAW 605 
uniform state action doctrine that did not depend upon the scope 
of the constitutional right in play.266 Other jurists and academic 
commentators have disagreed,267 and a review of cases involving 
race and other suspect categories suggests they have the better of 
the argument.268 Under this view, the doctrinal stability of the 
state action doctrine is a worthy sacrifice given the higher 
constitutional priorities at stake in the speech cases. 
San Francisco Arts & Athletics is exemplary of the 
heightened station accorded speech in state action cases.269 Recall 
that in that case, in addition to contesting the enforcement 
practices of the U.S. Olympic Committee under the Fifth 
Amendment, SF AA also mounted a facial challenge to the 
Amateur Sports Act under the First Amendment.27o Notable is 
that the Supreme Court took up the First Amendment challenge 
without separately analyzing its state action implications. 271 
Seemingly apparent to the Court was that Congress was the 
state actor for purposes of the First Amendment.272 If the Court 
was willing to invoke the First Amendment while assessing the 
Amateur Sports Act,273 then the Copyright Act should fall under 
similar constitutional scrutiny. 
These two harmonizing rationales are capable of explaining 
the prominence that the First Amendment enjoys within the 
copyright law. Unfortunately, they yield unpromising results for 
those who would turn to the Bill of Rights to curb the excesses of 
266. 419 U.S. 345,373-74 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
267. E.g., Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Vices. and Corporate Virtues: Do 
Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1484 & n.150 (1982) 
(arguing that "everyone suspects, although judges rarely say, that what is 'public' 
expands and contracts depending upon the substance of the plaintiff's claim" (citing King 
v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 505 F.3d 264, 266 (6th Cir. 1974) (disaffiliating from the 
trial judge's reasoning that "had the complaint been by Negro boys alleging racial 
discrimination [rather than girl plaintiffs], he would have found state action 'more 
readily'''))). 
268. See Berman, supra note 249, at 1267-70 (analyzing the state action doctrine as 
applied to cyberspace and arguing that "we must take the benefits of constitutive 
constitutionalism into consideration before we can truly evaluate the appropriate 
contours of our conception of state action"). Refer also to notes 239-44 supra and 
accompanying text (analyzing Shelley v. Kraemer to illustrate that courts may be more 
willing to find state action in the context of racial discrimination). 
269. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535-
42 (1987). 
270. [d. Refer also to notes 211-16 supra and accompanying text (analyzing the 
Court's decision). 
271. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. at 535-42. 
272. See id. 
273. See id. at 536-37, 540 (holding that the Amateur Sports Act's restriction of 
commercial speech did not violate the First Amendment because it was not broader "than 
necessary to further a substantial governmental interest"). 
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the modern patent system. The Patent Act is broadly 
structured274 and, until quite recently, has had little to do with 
speech. Enforcement of the patent right may not be viewed as 
necessarily implicating a discrete, fundamental right guaranteed 
by the Constitution. More like a private property owner exerting 
the trespass law to eject an unwelcome speaker, the relationship 
between the patent right and a particular constitutional 
guarantee appears more tangential. Even if a court were to apply 
the First Amendment to patent cases, its willingness to invoke 
the Constitution might not spill over to other provisions. 
The tendency of courts to find state action in cases involving 
compelling rights violations, such as racial discrimination or 
speech restraints, may also be less pronounced for patents. Even 
in a patent case that implicates a fundamental right, courts may 
be unwilling to allow a hard case to make bad law. The decision 
that a particular patent case involved state action would 
seemingly implicate every patent enforcement exercise with the 
entire panoply of constitutional defenses. 
The reasoning that patentees will not ordinarily be judged 
government actors seems paradoxical in light of other intellectual 
property cases. The best reading of the case law remains that the 
narrowly tailored copyright statute invokes the First 
Amendment,275 but application of the more robust Patent Act does 
not ordinarily entail any constitutional analysis at all. 276 This 
conclusion will likely please commentators who have found the 
state action doctrine wholly incongruous. It is considerably less 
comforting for concerned observers who seek to cabin a patent 
regime whose recent ambitions know no bounds. With hopes of 
fashioning meaningful constraints upon the contemporary patent 
system, this Article next turns to other constitutional provisions. 
IV. CONTEMPORARY PATENTING TRENDS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES 
That the once obscure patent system has come to bear 
upon constitutional rights should be of particular concern to 
civil libertarians. The patent canon, and to some extent the 
274. 60 AM. JUR. 2d Patents § 65 (2002) (noting that the legislative history and 
committee reports accompanying the 1952 Patent Act support a broad construction and 
indicate "that Congress intended statutory subject matter to include anything under the 
sun that is made by man"). 
275. See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 139, at 165-66 (noting that copyright law 
involves the First Amendment because copyright law necessarily restricts speech). 
276. See id. at 232-34 (observing that the Patent Act prevents others from making, 
using, or selling machines and processes, the restriction of which should not raise First 
Amendment concerns). 
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accumulated learning surrounding it, reflects a virtually 
unyielding faith in industrial progress and market 
mechanisms. Legislators have been encouraged to fashion 
robust property rights, create bargaining institutions, and 
establish compulsory licenses for those few instances in which 
transaction costs prevent voluntary bargained-for exchanges.277 
This account holds little prescriptive power where patenting 
has been divorced from technology and reoriented towards 
advocacy. The preceding examples suggest that the following 
six factors ought to play a role in patent enforcement 
determinations. 
1. Whether the Activities Constituting the Accused 
Infringement Themselves Are Subject to Recognized 
Protections. Enforcement proceedings should account for the 
implications of the proprietary interest upon acknowledged 
personal liberties. Courts should realize that individuals who 
perform abortion techniques, comply with legal provisions, and 
engage in speech enjoy substantive due process, equal 
protection, and free speech protections whether or not that 
behavior is also subject to patent rights. Whistleblowing 
against suspect patents should also be considered not just as 
an inducement of infringement, but as an exercise of freedom 
of expression. 
2. The Marketplace Availability of the Patented Invention 
or Its Substitutes. Cases such as Stenberg v. Carhart278 suggest 
that individuals may have a strong interest in the continued 
practice of a particular technique. 279 Where an accused 
infringer legitimately claims that the asserted patent restricts 
a recognized individual liberty interest, courts should consider 
whether appropriate noninfringing substitutes are available 
on the market. The case for infringement should be strongest 
where the patentee itself markets a commercial embodiment of 
the patented invention. Conversely, where no comparable 
product exists and the patentee hopes to suppress the patented 
invention, the case for patent infringement should be weakest. 
277. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 207,210-16 (1996) (proposing legislative change in current intellectual property 
law along the following three themes: (1) make clearer rules of law; (2) create property 
rights in uncharted assets, such as domain names; and (3) create bargaining institutions). 
278. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). Refer to text accompanying notes 102-15 supra. 
279. See Stenberg, U.S. at 935-38 (implying that pregnant women desiring an abortion 
may have strong health-based reasons to support the continued availability of the D & E 
partial-birth abortion technique). Refer also to notes 102-15 supra and accompanying text. 
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3. The Ability of Others to Design Around the Patented 
Invention. Many courts have observed that competitors of the 
patentee enjoy the ability to design around the patented 
invention. 280 However, experience teaches us that not all 
inventions are so readily the subject of reverse engineering. In 
such circumstances, courts should guard against the 
possibility that the patentee will abuse its position. Essentially 
a prospective version of present marketplace availability, this 
factor also resembles copyright's merger doctrine. 281 
4. The Reasons the Litigants Were Unable to Achieve a 
License. Some patent cases involve market failures such as high 
transaction costs or other externalities.282 The patent law has also 
attracted rights holders who seek to impose moratoria upon the 
practice of the patented invention.283 In either case, courts should 
consider whether the refusal to license the patented invention 
bears upon the patent law's goal of advancing the "useful Arts." 
5. The Desire for Patent-Induced Innovative Activity in the 
Field of the Patented Invention. Proponents of an ambitious scope 
of patentable subject matter often contend that post-industrial 
innovations present the same public goods problems as the 
technologies that have long been patented.284 Yet there are 
important differences between industrial artifacts and the more 
abstract behaviors that, innovative or not, have long been beyond 
the grasp of the patent law. In enforcing patents on post-
industrial invention, courts should also assess whether or not the 
patent system is necessary to achieve optimal levels of research 
and development expenditures within those fields. Courts should 
consider whether the copyright law sufficiently spurs innovation 
in speech or legal text, for example, and recognize that numerous 
280. E.g., Ishida Co. v. Taylor, 221 F.3d 1310, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
281. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) ("In no case does a copyright protection for an 
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of 
operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such a work.") 
282. See O'Rourke, supra note 55, at 1188 (organizing market failures into three 
categories: (1) high transaction costs' that frustrate private bargaining; (2) positive 
externalities that prevent the infringer from being able to pay the copyright owner's price 
for a license; and (3) the failure of any market for the particular use to develop). 
283. Refer to notes 37-52 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Newman-
Rifkin human chimera application that, if accepted, could impose a twenty-year 
moratorium on the use of chimera technology in the United States because neither 
patent-seeker plans to use or further the patented technology). 
284. E.g., Gregory J. Maier et aI., Patent Protection Provides Long-Term Net 
Strategy, 22 NAT'L L.J., Oct. 18, 1999, at B11. 
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private foundations presently fund research on abortion 
procedures without resort to the patent system. 
6. Whether Predecessors to the Patented Invention 
Traditionally Have Been the Subject of Patenting. Relating to the 
preceding factor is whether the patent system is deeply rooted in 
the discipline from which the patented invention springs. Actors 
within market sectors long subject to patenting are better able to 
account for this form of market regulation. In contrast, courts 
should recognize that actors in disciplines recently opened to the 
patent system are less likely to have arranged their affairs 
appropriately. 
As a matter of systems engineering, the fashioning of a 
subconstitutional restraint seems the best way to express these 
values. A legislative limitation on patent acquisition and 
enforcement that maintained the binding between patenting and 
technology, acknowledged individual liberties, and was 
specifically tailored to the patent system, would provide the best 
solution for checking the current pretensions of the patent bar. 
Revival of the defunct patent misuse doctrine,285 modification of 
copyright's fair use privilege,286 and strengthening of the nascent 
experimental use exemption287 each present possibilities. 
Neither the Patent Office nor Congress seem likely to 
initiate this project. The Patent Office wholly lacks competence to 
do so, for it possesses no substantive rulemaking authority in 
patent law.288 It seems that the courts, having preliminarily 
confronted patents on legal compliance and speech, will continue 
to bear primary responsibility for adopting the patent system to 
post-industrial patenting. 
If this prediction is correct, then the U.S. Constitution 
appears to be the sole source of legal doctrine in which the 
principles identified above can be anchored. With the bulk of the 
Bill of Rights likely inapplicable, another possible linchpin is the 
285. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 
78 CAL. L. REV. 1599, 1608-32 (1990) (describing the patent misuse doctrine, an equitable 
defense that permits "defendants in an infringement ... action [to] claim that the 
patentee plaintiff had 'misused' its patent grant"). 
286. See O'Rourke, supra note 55, at 1205--09, 1249-50. 
287. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 224-25, 230 (1987) (concluding that the 
experimental use defense may be a way to reconcile the patent monopoly with the 
research community's interest in building upon an inventor's discovery before the patent 
expires). 
288. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that 
because the Patent Office does not have substantial rulemaking power, its promulgations 
are essentially non-binding). 
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Intellectual Property Clause.289 For many observers, an 
originalist interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause 
offers a plausible limiting account upon the scope of the patent 
system.290 When confining the scope of patenting to the "useful 
Arts," the Framers likely contemplated only the industrial, 
mechanical, and manual arts of the late eighteenth century.291 
This characterization is also sympathetic to the maintenance of 
constitutionally protected rights. Retaining patenting within its 
traditional paths tends to maneuver the system away from the 
appropriation of protected liberties. 
Other commentators, however, have drawn scant hope from 
the Intellectual Property Clause.292 A textualist view of the 
Intellectual Property Clause might decide only that patented 
inventions must possess utility, a lenient stricture already 
imposed by the patent system.293 Even under the originalist 
account, determining the proper successors of the Industrial 
Revolution is exceptionally difficult. Contemporary human 
engagement with the artificial is total. As human existence 
becomes increasingly embedded in technology, the impact of 
traditionally patentable subject matter upon the exercise of 
individual liberties grows. 
Yet perhaps another constitutional principle may be of use 
in achieving patent reform. Frequently dismissed as a dead 
letter,294 but exhibiting "fitful signs of life recently,,,295 the 
289. See, e.g., Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of 
the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 46 (2000) (arguing that the 
language of the Intellectual Property Clause "may restrict some of Congress's more far-
reaching efforts in promoting intellectual property in recent years, particularly in passing 
ad hoc extensions of copyrights and patents for the benefit of individual companies"). The 
Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power "To 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
290. See Merges & Reynolds, supra note 289, at 46 ("From the earliest days of 
our nation to the present era, courts have repeatedly stressed that Congress's intellectual 
property powers under the [Intellectual Property) Clause are limited."). 
291. Refer to notes 17-21 supra and accompanying text (reviewing the historical 
roots of patent law as limited to the artifacts of the Industrial Revolution). 
292. See Stern, supra note 125, at 105, 127-28 ("There is no way to reach agreement 
on what is a useful art and, even more important, on what is not a useful art."); Merges & 
Reynolds, supra note 289, at 60 (asserting that, while the Intellectual Property Clause 
grants Congress the power to grant patents and copyrights for a "limited time," the length 
of that time is discretionary; Congress has extended the term by post hoc legislation 
favoring the patentee). 
293. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (providing that patentable subject matter includes 
any "new and useful" improvement thereof). 
294. See, e.g., Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st 
Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 943 (2000). 
295. United Beverage Co. of S. Bend, Inc. v. Ind. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 760 
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non delegation doctrine296 presents an unexplored possibility for 
curbing the excesses of modern patent law.297 The pretensions of 
modern patent law have clarified what might have been seen 
earlier: patent acquisition is a legislative function that Congress 
has bestowed upon private individuals. 298 Recognition of the 
breadth of this conferral invites consideration of the 
nondelegation doctrine to post-industrial patenting. 
The zenith of the nondelegation doctrine occurred with the 
well-known Supreme Court decisions in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. u. United States299 and Carter u. Carter Coal Co. 300 In Carter 
Coal, the Court held that Congress may not authorize private 
groups to make law.301 In both cases, the Court recited the 
dangers of corruption, arbitrary enforcement, and lack of political 
accountability that accompany private rulemaking.302 That the 
exercise of public power should reflect the will of the electorate 
. I fd t· 303 remaIns a core va ue 0 emocra IC governance. 
Much of what the Court said in these cases seems pertinent 
to the contemporary patent law. When Justice Sutherland 
announced that "in the very nature of things, one person may not 
be intrusted with the power to regulate the business of another, 
and especially of a competitor,"304 he might well have voiced 
concerns over patenting. The procedures established by the 
F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1985). 
296. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
543, 580 (2000) (describing the nondelegation doctrine as "the principle that Congress 
may not delegate, to public or private actors, its constitutionally assigned lawmaking 
power"). 
297. See id. at 580-81 (suggesting that resurrection of the nondelegation doctrine 
would "constrain the private exercise of public power"). 
298. See id. at 580-82 (noting that despite the existence of the nondelegation 
doctrine, Congress has bestowed lawmaking power on private individuals via delegation 
to federal agencies, and the Supreme Court has upheld this delegation). 
299. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
300. 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
301. See id. at 310-11 (declaring the provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation 
Act, which provided producers and miners with congressional authority to regulate labor 
and wages, an unconstitutional delegation oflegislative power). 
302. See id. (positing that permitting private coal producers and miners to regulate 
employee hours and wages results in the submission of the minority to the will of the 
majority, causing the minority to surrender to terms not out of choice but rather out of 
force); Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537 (holding that the delegation of authority to 
private trade or industrial associations to establish a "Live Poultry Code" and thereby 
regulate the industry, was an unconstitutional delegation of power "utterly inconsistent 
with the constitutional prerogatives and duties of Congress"). 
303. See Boyle, supra note 253, at 350-51 (emphasizing the government's significant 
role in developing intellectual property policy and criticizing the Clinton Administration's 
regulation of speech in cyberspace as "unwise and unconstitutional"). 
304. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 311. 
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National Industrial Recovery Aceo5 and the Bituminous Coal 
Conservation Act,306 through which trade associations and private 
groups could establish enforceable industrial codes, in fact seem 
to compare quite favorably to current patent practice. Although 
the Court condemned the power of a majority "to regulate the 
affairs of an unwilling minority" as "legislative delegation in its 
most obnoxious form,,,307 seemingly worse is the weekly grant to 
hundreds of individual patentees the power to regulate an entire 
industry in which they may not otherwise participate. 
Although discussions of the nondelegation doctrine usually 
begin with Schechter Poultry and Carter Coal, they most often 
end there as well. Since the New Deal the nondelegation doctrine 
has been of scant importance.308 Virtually all observers of 
government recognize that delegation of regulatory authority can 
promote efficient governance.309 So long as Congress provides 
sufficient policy goals and procedural safeguards, the Supreme 
Court has not been offended by legislative delegation in over half 
a century.310 In particular, the federal courts have been troubled 
only rarely by broad delegations of rulemaking power to 
t · . 311 execu Ive agencIes. 
Still, the state courts have preserved the delegation doctrine, 
often through the application of more specific nondelegation 
provisions in state constitutions.312 Exemplary is the recent decision 
of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Leathers v. Gulf Rice Arkansas, 
Inc. 313 That case involved state legislation authorizing a referendum 
to be conducted among rice producers.314 The rice producers were 
allowed to approve an assessment against rice buyers, with the 
proceeds to go towards rice promotion and market development 
projects.315 The Arkansas Supreme Court struck down the statute as 
an unlawful delegation of the legislative taxing power.316 The court 
observed that the statute imposed no standards to be considered 
prior to imposing the assessment; caused the assessment to be 
imposed without notice, opportunity to be heard, or review; and 
305. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 521-24. 
306. See Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 278-84. 
307. Id. at 311. 
308. Zellmer, supra note 294, at 943. 
309. Id. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. 
312. See Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist 
Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1191-1200 (1999). 
313. 994 S.W.2d 481 (Ark. 1999). 
314. Id. at 482-83. 
315. Id. 
316. Id. at 486. 
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authorized one group of private persons to tax a second, unwilling 
f . t 317 group 0 pnva e persons. 
The decision in Whitman u. American Trucking Associations, 
Inc. (ATA)318 suggests renewed interest in the nondelegation 
doctrine at the Supreme Court as well. The ATA Court reviewed 
a District of Columbia circuit court decision,319 holding that 
certain provisions of the Clean Air Act violated the nondelegation 
doctrine by failing to provide an "intelligible principle" to guide 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in formulating 
national ambient air quality standards.320 The Supreme Court 
reversed in a 9-0 decision, holding that the Clean Air Act fell 
"well within the outer limits of our non delegation precedents.,,321 
According to Justice Scalia, the terse instructions provided by 
Congress to the EPA through the Clean Air Act compared 
favorably with other provisions the Court had previously 
upheld.322 
Although not a single dissenter railed against the majority 
holding in ATA,323 the decision remains an important one for the 
non delegation doctrine. Rather than wholly rejecting the 
nondelegation doctrine as symptomatic of Lochner-era 
jurisprudence, the Court instead cited Schechter Poultry and 
other cases in its line with approva1.324 The Court also confirmed 
that "the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies 
according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.,,325 
Contrasting EPA regulation of obscure "country elevators" with 
"setting air standards that affect the entire national economy," 
Justice Scalia observed that Congress would be required to 
provide greater guidance for the latter than the former. 326 
With the nondelegation doctrine once more in play, however 
faintly, application of its principles to the modern patent system 
appears quite timely. At first blush, this analysis may not appear 
particularly fruitful. The Constitution includes an express 
317. [d. 
318. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
319. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
320. [d. at 1034. 
321. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474. The Court's decision with regard to Parts I and IV 
was unanimous; Part III of the opinion, which discusses the delegation precedent, was 
joined by seven of the nine Justices. See id. at 472-76. 
322. [d. at 462,473,475-76. 
323. [d. at 486-87 (Thomas, J., concurring), 487-90 (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment), 490-96 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). 
324. [d. at 474. 
325. [d. at 475. 
326. [d. 
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authorization for Congress to award exclusive rights to 
inventors. 327 Surely the Framers contemplated delegation of 
authority via the patent law.328 While the Intellectual Property 
Clause surely countenances delegation, however, there is no 
reason to suspect that it collapses the core distinctions between 
private and public lawmaking that undergird our scheme of 
government. As suggested by historical experience with differing 
patent acquisition and enforcement schemes,329 the Intellectual 
Property Clause does not specify how public authority passes into 
the hands of a private patentee, nor does it delimit specific 
avenues of enforcement.33o 
Each issued patent instills in all of us the duty to avoid 
practicing the patented invention without the permission of the 
patentee.331 Thus, there can be no question that Congress has 
conferred rulemaking power through the patent system.332 The 
identity of the delegate is less apparent. Scholarly commentary 
involving the delegation doctrine normally need not consider this 
issue, for it focuses discussion upon so-called unified agencies. 
Unified agencies, including the International Trade Commission 
and EPA, combine "substantive rulemaking, enforcement, and 
adjudication" functions. 333 In such circumstances, the delegate 
obviously is the agency itself. 
The sui generis regime of patents presents more complex 
issues of delegation. The Patent Office obviously receives much 
authority under the Patent Act, but its capabilities fall far short 
of most federal administrative agencies. The role of the Patent 
Office in the patent system is surprisingly limited.334 Its principal 
327. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
328. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful 
Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States 
Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 13, 38, 54 (1994) (considering the Framers' 
considerations during the drafting of the Constitution). 
329. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6-12 (1966). 
330. Id. at 5-6 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, for the proposition that, although 
the Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress broad power to award exclusive rights 
for the promotion of the useful arts, the Clause does not specifY a procedure for awarding 
these rights). 
331. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000). 
332. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-7 (stating that Congress may create a federal agency 
to administer the patent system). 
333. Brian C. Whipps, Substantial Evidence Supporting the Clearly Erroneous 
Standard of Review: The PTO Faces Of{ Against the Federal Circuit, 24 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 1127, 1150 (1998). 
334. See Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. & 
MARy L. REV. 127, 138 (2000) [hereinafter Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law] (describing the 
ministerial nature of the Patent Office's roles). 
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task is to facilitate the grant ofpatents.335 The Patent Office lacks 
substantive rulemaking ability even within the field of patent 
law,336 and its regulatory authority is limited to managing Patent 
Office proceedings and disciplining individuals licensed to 
practice before it.337 Crucially, the Patent Office neither enforces 
patents nor adjudicates patent infringement disputes itself. 338 
Authority for patent enforcement has been transferred to the 
private sector, which essentially commences a qui tam action 
with each charge of patent infringement in the courts. 
Thus, in a very real sense, the Patent Office is not the sole 
delegate of rulemaking power under the Patent Act. Private 
individuals also enjoy a transfer of power through the Patent 
Act.339 Individuals themselves phrase the patent claims that, if 
issued, amount to proprietary rights in privately drafted federal 
regulations. As patentees they enjoy unfettered discretion to 
enforce their patent right by bringing a civil action in federal 
court. If everyone wants to be a regulator, the patent system 
amounts to a leveling construct that encourages governance by 
private citizens. 
So patenting involves congressional delegation to both 
Patent Office and private citizen. The next question is whether 
this delegation is improper. Again, at first glance, this argument 
seems quite feeble. The Patent Act is a complex code that 
specifies Patent Office operations at a fine level of detai1.340 
Among the provisions of the patent code are a recounting of 
patentability standards,341 description of patenting procedures,342 
335. Id. at 138-40. 
336. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543,1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
337. See Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law, supra note 334, at 166-67 (comparing the 
Patent Office's power to manage proceedings to a federal court's power to manage its own 
cases); see also 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (delineating the Patent Office's power to establish 
regulations). 
338. See Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law, supra note 334, at 143 (illustrating that 
federal courts review patent suits in one of two ways: a direct appeal against the Patent 
Office by a rejected patent applicant, or an infringement action against an alleged 
infringer by a patent owner); see also John B. Pegram, Should There Be a U.S. Trial Court 
with a Specialization in Patent Litigation?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 766, 772 
(2000) (revealing that the Patent Office ''has no direct role to play in patent infringements 
actions"). 
339. See Brian Kahin, The Expansion of the Patent System: Politics and Political 
Economy, 6 FIRST MONDAY 1 (Jan. 2000) (noting that "[p]atents are, in effect, rules that 
are drafted and proposed by . . . private applicants who have considerable leeway in 
formulating and expressing the claims, approved by the [Patent Office], and then 
privately enforced"), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue6_lIkahinlindex.html (last 
visited Sept. 13, 2002). 
340. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376. 
341. Id. §§ 102-103 (requiring that the proposed patent be novel and non-obvious). 
342. See, e.g., id. § 111. 
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and stipulation of the internal structure of the Patent Office.343 
The Patent Office seemingly acts well within the permissive 
delegation standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
ATA and predecessor cases.344 
But this analysis misses the mark for two reasons. First, it 
overlooks the reality that the Patent Act confers considerable 
authority to patentees as well.345 No statutory mandates guide 
patentees in their acquisition and enforcement of their 
proprietary rights. 346 Patent owners are free to weigh any 
particular values they wish, or none at all, when they undertake 
to apply for patent rights or enforce them. If patentees are indeed 
assessed as delegates under the Patent Act, then that statute 
faces significant troubles under even the Supreme Court's most 
lenient non delegation decisions. Lacking even a minimal 
incantation about preserving the public interest, the patent 
statute's wholly standardless delegation must count as an 
impermissible one. 
Second, Patent Office procedures are conspicuous for their 
failure to employ the safeguards observed in modern 
administrative law. Patent acquisition occurs in an ex parte 
environment in which Patent Office personnel lack an 
adversarial posture towards the applicant.347 Examiners instead 
are tasked to assist applicants in fulfilling the statutory 
requirements. 348 As explained in the 2000 Patent Office Corporate 
Plan: "The Patent Business is one of the [Patent Office's] three 
core businesses. The primary mission of the Patent Business is to 
help customers get patents."349 
The accepted administrative protections of notice, 
opportunity for comment, and judicial review350 also play little 
role in the patent system. The Patent Office has traditionally 
held all applications in secret, and even more recent legal 
343, Id, §§ 2-3, 
344, Refer to notes 299-333 supra and accompanying text (chronicling the 
development of the nondelegation doctrine through Supreme Court decisions from 
Schechter Poultry to ATA). 
345. See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1. 
346. See id. ("Once the patent is granted, the PTO engages in no form of external 
review or quality control and takes no responsibility for the functioning ofthe system as a 
whole."). 
347. See id. 
348. See Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law, supra note 334, at 138-39 (indicating that an 
examiner's role is simply to "apply a legal standard determined by Congress and the 
courts to the facts presented ... by the applicant"). 
349. See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1. 
350. Refer to notes 313-17 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Arkansas 
Supreme Court's Gulf Rice decision, which recognized these administrative protections). 
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reforms call for only piecemeal publication of pending 
applications.351 Under this regime, the public has no sure way of 
knowing whether a patent is about to issue or even whether a 
patent application has been filed. 352 Patentees have frequently 
sued competitors on the day a patent issues,353 the first point in 
time at which anyone could have known the patent even existed. 
Lack of notice obviously denies individuals the opportunity to 
comment upon pending patent applications as well. These weak 
procedural safeguards provided by the Patent Act are 
accompanied by a growing suspicion that the Patent Office 
cannot competently perform even its core examination 
functions. 354 
Judicial review applies to patent acquisition procedures only 
in muted form. Disappointed patent applicants may appeal 
Patent Office rejections to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit or the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia.355 Members of the public possess no parallel right with 
regard to issued patents, however.356 An interested competitor 
who sought a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity would 
face dismissal unless the patentee had accused him of 
infringement.35? Even the Patent Office Director is unable to 
appeal the approval of a patent application by a member of the 
. . 358 
exammmg corps. 
Accused infringers do enjoy the dubious privilege of being 
able to contest the validity of patents that have been asserted 
against them.359 Practical constraints restrict this ability as well. 
Issued patents bear a presumption of validity that must be 
351. 35 U.S.C. § 122(a) (2000). 
352. See id. § 122(b)(2). 
353. John R. Thomas, On Preparatory Texts and Proprietary Technologies: The Place 
of Prosecution Histories in Patent Claim Interpretation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 183, 201 & 
n.103 (1999) (highlighting recent cases in which patent infringement suits were filed on 
the same day as the issued patent). 
354. See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1 (suggesting that the Patent Office is not 
organized in a manner that will benefit both the patentees and their competitors); 
Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 58, at 589-91 (describing problems at the 
Patent Office). 
355. 35 U.S.C. §§ 144-145. 
356. Pegram, supra note 338, at 772 (stating that patent procedures generally favor 
patent owners and indicating that the only avenues available to a third party are to file a 
protest against a pending patent, or to request reexamination of a granted patent). 
357. See Lisa A. Dolak, Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Patent Cases: 
Restoring the Balance Between the Patentee and the Accused Infringer, 38 B.C. L. REV. 
903,903-04 (1997) (discussing an accused infringer's limited rights against a patentee). 
358. 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-146 (refusing to provide the Patent Office Director with 
appellate review of patent applications). 
359. Id. § 282 (discussing the defenses available to an accused infringer). 
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overcome by clear and convincing evidence.36o Defendants must 
also bear the weighty costs of patent litigation361 and confront 
courts that can be quick to issue preliminary injunctions. 
In sum, then, nondelegation principles potentially present 
serious concerns for the patent system. As a class of delegates, 
patentees are wholly unregulated. Although the Patent Act offers 
examiners intelligible standards to consider when analyzing 
patent applications, the Patent Office has been notorious for its 
inability to uphold them.362 Decades of examining experience has 
taught us that however comprehensible, these standards are not 
practically achievable. Patent acquisition procedures also lack 
acknowledged administrative safeguards.363 
Despite these severe suspicions about the whole of the 
patent law, a court would seem less likely to apply the 
non delegation doctrine to traditional subjects of industrial 
property. Much like the "country elevators" of ATA,364 patents on 
dental floss,365 fishing rods,366 and fluorescent toilet seats367 do not 
seem the subject of a particularly robust conferral of lawmaking 
ability. The patent system's constitutional status and long 
history of allowing private appropriation of technological 
artifacts weigh against broad application of the nondelegation 
doctrine to the entirety of Patent Office work product. 
The likely reluctance of courts to apply the nondelegation 
doctrine comprehensively against patenting should not be taken 
360. Id.; see, e.g., Dana Corp. v. Am. Axle & Mfg., Inc., 279 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (recognizing that a patent's presumption of validity "can only be overcome by clear 
and convincing evidence offacts to the contrary"). 
361. See Pegram, supra note 338, at 769 (noting the three primary defenses available 
to accused infringers-noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability---each of which 
can be asserted in seeking a declaratory judgment to resolve the dispute rather than 
awaiting a suit by the patentee); see also Kahin, supra note 339, at 1 (warning that the 
strong presumption of validity results in "higher transaction costs on those who seek to 
challenge patents and exacerbates the free-rider problem of invalidating patents," which 
frequently forces the accused infringer to settle the dispute rather that pursue a viable 
attack on the patent's validity). 
362. See Kahin, supra note 339, at 1 (critiquing the patent system's level of quality 
by pointing to "the limited knowledge and experience of patent examiners" as well as "the 
difficulty of applying such a [subjective patent] standard in [a] volatile and fast-changing 
environment"); Merges, Six Impossible Patents, supra note 58, at 589-91. 
363. Refer to notes 313-17 supra and accompanying text (discussing the Arkansas 
Supreme Court's Gulf Rice decision, which acknowledged proper procedural and 
administrative safeguards). 
364. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (referencing the 
exemption of "country elevators" from new stationary-source regulations). 
365. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,819,767 (issued Oct. 13, 1998) ("Sterile Dental Floss 
Segments"). 
366. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,000,164 (issued Dec. 14, 1999) ("Fishing Rod"). 
367. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 6,151,723 (issued Nov. 28, 2000) ("Toilet Seat Lifter with 
Leverage Adjustment"). 
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as a weakness. Courts ought to recognize that alongside the 
Patent Act, individual patent instruments themselves embody 
congressional conferrals of legislative power. That the 
nondelegation doctrine may be used selectively, against discrete 
patent instruments, increases the likelihood it will be applied in 
the first place. ATA and its predecessors further support a 
selective approach. These precedents contemplate a sliding scale, 
where the case for a nondelegation violation is strongest, and 
where the scope of the congressional conferral is greatest.36S 
Surely private appropriations implicating protected 
constitutional interests should be subject to heightened judicial 
scrutiny. 
Where state action may lead to restrictive judicial 
supervision of the patent system, the nondelegation doctrine 
would enable courts to take aim at private appropriations that 
implicate protected constitutional interests. No longstanding 
patent practice checks the application of nondelegation principles 
here. The Patent Office has only recently allowed individuals to 
procure these sorts of patents, and it arguably lacks a firm 
constitutional grounding when doing so. Potentially a sobering 
influence upon a patent system run amok, the nondelegation 
doctrine provides an underappreciated avenue for restraining 
patents that offend cherished individual liberties. 
v. CONCLUSION 
With Congress showing no apparent signs of interest in 
curbing the scope of patenting, courts may find the nondelegation 
doctrine an appropriate vehicle for recognizing public restrictions 
upon private governance. Acknowledgment that patenting 
principally serves a legislative function, and that private citizens 
have themselves been conferred lawmaking power, are necessary 
steps for recognizing non delegation arguments in this context. 
These steps ought to be taken. With application of the state 
action doctrine and Intellectual Property Clause uncertain, the 
nondelegation doctrine offers accused patent infringers a 
backdoor to the Bill of Rights. If the account of the modern 
patent system is appropriately constructed, the Constitution may 
yet serve as a meaningful restraint upon the excesses of the 
dizzying ambitions of the contemporary intellectual property 
community. 
368. See TRIBE, supra note 150, at 365 ("The Supreme Court is most likely to reject 
broad delegations of congressional power, typically on statutory grounds, when the action 
of the government agency claiming delegated power touches constitutionally sensitive 
areas of substantive liberty."). 
